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Abstract
This thesis explored the possibility of deriving constraints on the
acquisition of adjective meanings from knowledge of the semantics of
adjectives. Chapter 1 briefly reviews the problem of learning the meanings of
words and possible classes of solutions. It is proposed that an important
source of constraint on the meanings of novel words can be derived from
studying adult's knowledge of language and how it is related to nonlinguistic
cognition.
In Chapter 2, I propose a semantic analysis of adjectives and how they
combine with their arguments in different structural relations. It is proposed
that there are two kinds of adjectives. The first kind of adjectives name
properties of things. These adjectives name values along dimensions.
Adjectives that name values on dimensions are proposed to combine with
nouns in two ways. In predication, these adjectives name the value that the
entity named by the subject has on the relevant dimension. In modification,
the value named by the adjective is used to pick out the objects of the kind
named by its argument. The second type of adjectives are those that do not
name values on dimensions but combine with nouns to pick out kinds of
things. The semantic analysis presented here is based on structural notions
and is not meant to be in conflict with syntactic theories though the semantics
are used to explain certain phenomena which may also have syntactic
explanations. In the rest of this thesis I show how this knowledge of the
semantics of adjectives can explain a number of linguistic and
psycholinguistic facts as well as motivate heuristics for the acquisition of
adjective meanings.
The third chapter investigated the constraints on structures and the
interpretation of structures that follow from the semantics of modification. It
was found that the semantic analysis of adjectives can be used to explain why
adjectives cannot modify NPs (*big the dog), pronouns (*big he), proper
names (*big John) and quantified expressions (*the big one dog).
Furthermore, the semantic analysis of adjectives provided an explanation for
when prenominal adjectives can be interpreted as being modificational and
when they have to be interpreted appositively.
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The fourth chapter shows that the semantics of adjectives can be used
to explain when multiple adjectives have to be ordered and how they have to
be ordered. In addition to explaining why there are preferred adjective orders
(the big red plastic ball), the analysis provides an explanation for the
conditions under which these orders can be violated. The explanation is
supported by psycholinguistic data from previous research.
Chapter five investigates the restrictions on which expression can
occur in the position that prenominal adjectives appear in (e.g. *the proud of
his son man, * the afraid man). Once again, the semantics of adjectives
provide an explanation for the restriction that applies to expressions in
prenominal position.
Having provided psycholinguistic and linguistic evidence that the
semantic analysis of adjectives, chapter six investigates whether the semantic
analysis can be used to derive constraints that can help the learner infer the
meaning of a novel word. After reviewing the literature on children's
acquisition of adjectives, three heuristics are derived from the semantics of
adjectives and tested in experiments with two and three year old children and
adults. The results of the experiments and previous research suggest that the
semantic knowledge of adjectives that children have is the same as that of
adults and that children can use this knowledge to help them learn the
meanings of novel words.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Susan Carey
Title: Professor of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
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Chapter 1
The Problem of Word Learning
1.1 Introduction.
Learning the meaning of a word requires that we learn to use the word
to talk about the same range of entities, situations or relations that our speech
community uses the word for. In other words, learning the meaning of a
word requires the learner to guess what the speaker had in mind when the
speaker used the word.
It has long been noted that in a situation of ostensive definition, there
are an infinite number of hypotheses about the meaning of the novel word
that are consistent with the evidence that the learner has available. Put
another way, word learning presents a particular instance of the induction
problem. A famous example from Quine (1960) illustrates this problem. If a
speaker utters gavagai! in the presence of a rabbit, the evidence the learner
has concerning the meaning of gavagai is consistent with an infinite set of
meanings including rabbit, white, furry, smaller than an elephant,
undetachable part of rabbit, rabbit in front of me right now, and rabbit or
telephone. Furthermore, there is no way to rule out some of these
hypotheses as being logically more primitive than others (Goodman, 1958).
This suggests that the learner has to be constrained in the hypotheses that he
or she considers. A number of researchers have suggested constraints that
may be used in the process of word learning (Bloom, 1990; Brown, 1957; Clark,
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1987; Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Markman,
1989; Soja, Carey, & Spelke, 1991). Before discussing specific constraints that
have been proposed to play a role in word learning I will explore the problem
of learning the meaning of a word and possible classes of solutions to this
problem.
As mentioned above, the problem the learner has to solve is to guess
what the speaker had in mind when the speaker used the novel word. The
solution to this problem is obvious -- the learner needs to have a way to read
the speaker's mind. The better the mind reader the learner is, the more
successful the learner will be in guessing the state of affairs the speaker has in
mind when the speaker uses the word. This ability to read the speaker's mind
is presumably due to the brains of the speaker and the listener being
extremely similar and processing similar inputs in similar ways. The project
for researchers interested in word learning is to discover the ways in which
the learner tries to guess what the speaker may be talking about. The task is
an extremely difficult one -- we can, and do, speak about things and
situations which are immediately observable by the listener but we also speak
about events in the past, the future, mental states and possible states of affairs.
The solution to the mind reading problem is likely to require many different
types of knowledge.
1.2 Nonlinguistic constraints.
One kind of knowledge that will be useful in trying to infer what the
speaker is talking about is that of the context in which the novel word is used.
For example, if a speaker has made it known to the listener that he/she is
extremely hungry then the listener may infer that a novel word in a request
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such as can you please pass me the blicket? is likely to be the name for a kind
of food.
Another way in which the learner can use contextual information to
infer the meaning of a novel word is to use the meanings of the other words
in an utterance. For example if a learner hears a sentence with the words
John, delicious, eat and blicket in it, and if the learner knows the meaning of
John, delicious and eat, then it is a good guess that blicket names something
to eat. Note that this is not using knowledge of language structure to infer
the meaning of the novel word. Rather it is using knowledge of the context
which has been conveyed linguistically (Pinker, 1992).
Though it is clear that adults and possibly children can and do use
knowledge of the world and context to try and infer the speaker's intention
when using a particular word, there are not any well worked out theories of
how we make inferences given our world knowledge or how we infer the
mental states of others. This makes it difficult to propose constraints on word
meaning that are derived from our world knowledge and knowledge of
others' intentional states and thus constraints that are proposed on the basis
of these types of knowledge are likely to be ad-hoc and situation specific.
1.3 Constraints from knowledge of language use.
The learner can also use knowledge of language use to try and guess
what the speaker is talking about. Grice (1975) has proposed that participants
in a conversation usually behave in accordance with a principle of co-
operation. He argues,
Our talk exchanges ... are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative
efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose
or set of purposes, or at least mutually accepted direction... at each stage, some
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possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable.
We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants
participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
(Grice, 1975: pg 45)
Grice went on to specify a number of maxims that are part of the cooperative
principle. The maxims included the maxim of quality and the maxim of
relation. The maxim of quality states that the speaker should not say what
he/she believes to be false or things which the speaker lacks adequate
evidence. The maxim of relation states that the speaker should be relevant.
If the learner knows these maxims and assumes that the speaker is being
cooperative, then the learner can assume that the information that the
speaker is providing in an utterance is relevant and believed by the speaker to
be true. For example, if the speaker points to an object and says, that is a table,
then the maxim of quality predicts that the speaker's name for the object is
table rather than something else like ball. Similarly, if the learner asks the
speaker what an object is, the maxim of relation predicts that the speaker
should respond with a name for the object rather than some unrelated truth
such as the speaker's favorite color.
Another example of a constraint on word meaning that may be a
pragmatic constraint is the principle of contrast (Clark, 1987; Gathercole, 1987).
The principle of contrast states that no two words can have the same
meaning. It is possible that this constraint is due to the structure of the
lexicon, but it may also be true that this constraint is due to the listener
assuming that if the speaker wanted to convey a meaning for which a word is
already known, then the speaker would have used the familiar/conventional
word.
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The examples given above show how a learner can use knowledge of
language use to try and infer what the speaker has in mind when the speaker
uses a word or utterance. Any complete theory of word learning will include
constraints that are based on a learner's knowledge of language use. It is an
empirical question, however, how much pragmatic knowledge the young
child has. There is some evidence that young children behave in accordance
to the principle of contrast (Clark, 1987; Au & Markman, 1987) but there is
little work on how children may use other kinds of pragmatic knowledge in
word learning.
1.4 Constraints from links between language and nonlinguistic
cognition.
A number of researchers have proposed that children can make use of
links between language and nonlinguistic cognition to learn the meanings of
words (Bloom, 1990b,1991; Brown, 1957; Clark, 1987; Gelman & Markman,
1985; Gleitman, 1990; Hall, 1991; Hall & Waxman, in press; Katz, Baker, &
Macnamara, 1974; Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988; Markman & Hutchinson,
1984; Markman, 1989; Soja, Carey, & Spelke, 1991; Soja, 1992; Taylor &
Gelman, 1988; Waxman & Gelman, 1986). While these researchers agree that
children may use links between language and cognition to learn the
meanings of words, the exact links that are proposed vary.
For a learner to use knowledge of language structure to infer the
meanings of words it has to be the case that there are bi-directional links
between grammatical knowledge and nonlinguistic cognition. This condition
differs from the uni-directional connection between nonlinguistic cognition
and grammar that theories of semantic bootstrapping assume (Grimshaw,
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1981; Pinker, 1984). Semantic bootstrapping theories propose that part of our
knowledge of language includes correlations between form and meaning; for
example, objects are named by nouns and actions are named by verbs. It is
proposed that we exploit this knowledge of language to identify instances of
grammatical categories such as nouns and verbs. Because the correlations
between form and meaning are proposed to be uni-directional it is not
possible to use knowledge of the grammatical category of a novel word to
learn its meaning. The motivation for proposing that the connections
between grammar and cognition are uni-directional is that the links don't
seem to be one-to-one. For example, though names for objects are always
nouns and names for actions are always verbs, nouns don't always name
objects (e.g. idea); similarly verbs don't always name actions (e.g. seem).
Bloom (1990b) argues that grammatical categories have abstract
semantic properties that make it possible to have bi-directional connections
between nonlinguistic cognition and grammatical categories. For example,
Bloom (1990b; 1992) proposes that count nouns name kinds of entities that are
construed as individuals. He proposes that this is the semantic knowledge
that underlies the adult's representation of count nouns. An advantage of
this account is that it helps to explain why abstract words like day and inch are
lexicalized as count nouns; these words name concepts that are necessarily
quantified in terms of individuals. Furthermore, Bloom proposes that
children have knowledge of grammar-cognition links innately and can
exploit them to learn the meanings of novel words. The constraint is
supported by word learning experiments in which children take words used
to talk about objects as naming the kind of object (Dickinson, 1988; Markman
& Wachtel, 1988; Soja, 1987; Soja, Carey, & Spelke, 1991; Soja, 1992). Objects
are usually conceptualized as individuals and thus are easily taken to be
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named by count nouns. Bloom (1990) has shown that three year olds can also
name individuals that are not objects when a count noun is used. He showed
that children are more likely to think that a novel word names a discrete
punctate sound than a continuous sound when the novel word is a count
noun than when it is a mass noun. This result shows that children expect
count nouns to name individuals and that the individuals do not have to be
objects but can be temporally individuated sounds. This pattern of results is
predicted if children, like adults, have grammar-cognition links which lead
them to expect count nouns to name individuals.
Another proposal that exploits the correspondences between linguistic
structure and meaning that exist in adult language has been made by
Gleitman (1990). She proposed that children may be able to learn the
meanings of verbs by keeping track of the syntactic contexts in which a verb
can occur. Gleitman and her colleagues (Fisher, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1991;
Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz, & Gleitman, 1991; Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Naigles,
1990) have presented evidence which suggests that children and adults may
be able to use the syntactic contexts in which a verb appears to learn aspects of
the verb's meaning.
While one may be able to learn certain aspects of a verb's or a noun's
meaning from it's syntactic contexts, Pinker (1992) argues that the amount of
meaning that one can learn from purely structural information is minimal.
That this is the case is evident if one looks at the proposal Bloom (1990b)
makes for the semantic knowledge underlying count nouns. The only thing
that a learner can infer from a speaker's use of a count noun is that the
speaker is talking about something which is construed as an individual. On
it's own, this information tells the learner only that the thing being spoken
about is the kind of thing that can be counted and cannot be arbitrarily
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divided to yield other entities named by the same word. When combined
with a nonlinguistic representation of a context, the grammar-cognition links
can play an important role in determining what is being spoken about. For
example, if a speaker points to an object and names it with a count noun then
if the learner knows that count nouns name individuals, the learner will be
able to rule out those construals of the entity that do not correspond to
individuals such as the substance of which the object is made or its texture or
color. This is an example of the "zoom lens" effect (Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz, &
Gleitman, 1991) in that it focuses the listener on the structurally encoded
perspective that the speaker wants the listener to take. Furthermore, if one
has knowledge of the meanings of other words in the sentence and how they
are structurally related to the novel word, one can further constrain one's
hypotheses about the meaning of the novel word (Pinker, 1992). For example,
if one knows that blicket names animate entities then the hypotheses
regarding the meaning of a novel verb glip heard in a context such as the
blicket glipped the fep are greatly constrained. The hypotheses are further
constrained if one knows the meaning of fep.
The current thesis investigates how one can use knowledge of the
semantics of adjectives and how they combine with words in structural
relations to "zoom in" on the type of meaning. Furthermore, it is proposed
how this knowledge can be combined with nonlinguistic knowledge of the
entities in question to help infer the meaning of novel words. The heuristics
for how we may learn the meanings of novel adjectives are derived from an
analysis of how adjectives are represented by adults.
The constraints that are proposed in this thesis are derived from the
links that exist between language and cognition in adults because knowledge
of what is acquired provides an important source of constraint on acquisition
14
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mechanisms. In order to have a theory of how something is acquired one
needs to know what is acquired. This approach to acquisition, often called the
learnability approach, has been standard in research on the acquisition of
syntax (Wexler & Culicover, 1980; Pinker, 1984; Hyams, 1986). Until recently
relatively little research (Bloom, 1990; Clark, 1987; Gelman & Markman, 1985;
Hall, 1991; Hall & Waxman, in press; Katz, Baker & Macnamara, 1974; Soja,
1992) has used knowledge of what is acquired as a source of constraint on the
meanings of novel words. One reason why this may be the case is that it is
not clear exactly what a theory of meaning should account for. While this is
true, one cannot state a priori what the domain of any theory will turn out to
be. An approach that has been successful in the study of syntax and lexical
semantics is to try to discover the components of meaning that are relevant to
linguistic structure (Levin & Pinker, 1992). While it is clear that there is more
to the meaning of a word than those aspects of meaning that are relevant to
structure, the study of these components of meaning allows one to propose
acquisition mechanisms in a motivated way. The aspects of meaning that are
relevant to the structure of sentences have to be acquired by the learner and
thus any theory of meaning has to minimally account for how these aspects
of meaning are acquired.
By taking an approach in which the constraints on word meaning are
derived from the adult's knowledge of language, one avoids a number of
problems associated with postulating that the child's knowledge of language
is different from that of the adults. These problems include: (i) How does the
child come to have the adult knowledge?, (ii) Are the differences observed
between children and adults due to a difference in their knowledge about
how language encodes meanings or are the differences due to other factors?,
and (iii) How does the proposed difference in knowledge fit with the large
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body of data suggesting that children's knowledge is the same as that of
adults? (Bloom, 1990a; 1990b; Poeppel & Wexler, 1992; Naigles, 1990; see
Crain, 1991 for a review). This question is important because grammatical
categories and principles are often interdefined and interdependent and thus
denying the child some aspect of adult knowledge may imply denying them
other knowledge too.
1.6 Overview of thesis.
While there has been a great deal of research done on how children
learn nouns, there has been relatively little work done on how children learn
the meaning of adjectives (Carey, 1978; Gelman & Taylor 1988; Gelman &
Ebeling, 1986; Golinkoff, Mennuti, Lengle, & Hermon, 1992; Smith, Jones, &
Landau, 1992). In this thesis, I propose a few constraints that may be used in
learning the meanings of adjectives that are motivated by a semantic analysis
of adjectives. In Chapter 2, I present a semantic analysis of adjectives that is
proposed to underly an adult's knowledge of adjectives. In the next three
chapters I examine a number of phenomenon that are explained by the
proposed analysis and thus provide evidence for the analysis. In Chapter 6, I
review the research on the acquisition of adjectives and how it relates to the
proposal of the semantics of adjectives developed in this thesis. I also
propose three constraints on the acquisition of adjective meanings that are
motivated by the semantic analysis of adjectives. The heuristics are tested in
experiments with adults and children. The chapter also summarizes the
results and identifies questions that the current research raises.
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Chapter 2
Semantic Knowledge of Adjectives
2.1 Semantic relations and structure.
Language allows speakers to express an inummerable number of
thoughts and comprehend sentences that they have never heard before. This
ability can only be accounted for if humans have a generative knowledge
system. This knowledge system specifies the manner in which words with
specific meanings can be combined to produce a sentence with a given
meaning. For example, if one wants to express the thought that JOHN LIKES
MARY then there is a specific way in which one combines the words John,
likes, and Mary to express this thought. In English, one would express this
thought in a sentence like (1). The combinations in (2)-(6) cannot be used to
express the thought JOHN LIKES MARY, though (5) can express a thought in
English. Note that the thought JOHN LIKES MARY can also be expressed in
sentence (7). The relation that holds between like, John and Mary in (1) is the
same as the relation that holds between these words in (7): Mary is the logical
object of like and John is the logical subject of like in both (1) and (7). This
insight motivated a transformational theory of grammar.
(1) John likes Mary.
(2) * John Mary likes.
(3) * likes John Mary.
(4) * likes Mary John.
(5) * Mary likes John.
(6) * Mary John likes.
(7) Mary is liked by John.
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The point that is relevant to the current thesis is that certain semantic
relations are structurally encoded in a sentence. The semantic relationships
that are structurally encoded in a sentence are called grammatical functions
(Chomsky, 1965).1 Examples of grammatical functions include:
(8) (i) Subject-of: [NP, S]
(ii) Predicate-of: [VP, S]
(iii) Direct-Object-of: [NP, VP]
(iv) Main-Verb-of: [V, VP]
Thus, Subject-of encodes a relation that holds between an NP and an S,
Predicate-of encodes a relation between a VP and an S and so on... The
examples of grammatical functions given above are structurally defined
semantic relations that have specific names but one can talk about many
other structurally defined relations. For example, the relation between
Subject and Verb can be defined as the relation between the Subject-of a
Sentence and the Main-Verb-of the Predicate-of the Sentence (Chomsky,
1965).
In section 2.2, I will present an analysis of the basic ways in which
adjectives can semantically combine with nouns and how this places
constraints on what structures are allowed and how they are interpreted. The
question of interest is how words with certain types of meaning (adjectives in
the present case) semantically combine with arguments in different structural
positions. Sentence (9) illustrates the interaction of word meaning and
structural relations. The sentence is syntactically well formed but is
I The examples of how certain semantic relations are structurally represented given here are
from a theory of the type discussed in Chomsky (1965). The particular semantic relations, how
they are encoded in structures and the relationship between different levels of representations
are different in current theories of grammar but the idea that certain semantic relations are
structurally encoded remains (Chomsky, 1986).
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semantically anomalous because a table is not the kind of thing that can kick.
The structure indicates that table is the subject of the verb kick, and boy is the
object of the verb. It is because the relations between boy, table and kick are
structurally defined in the way that they are that the sentence is anomalous.
If boy and table exchange positions in the structure, then the sentence is no
longer anomalous. The anomaly in (9) is not due to a restriction on the type
of word that can occur in subject position (e.g. must be animate). The
anomaly is due to the selectional restrictions placed on the subject by the verb
kick. It is perfectly fine to have an inanimate subject with a verb like frighten
(10).
(9) The table kicked the boy.
(10) The table frightened the boy.
In the next few chapters, I will be investigating how certain structurally
represented semantic relations between adjectives and various types of
phrases are interpreted. The semantic analysis of how adjectives combine
semantically with nouns will then be used to motivate some constraints on
mechanisms for the acquisition of adjective meanings.
2.2 A semantic analysis of adjective.
The semantic analysis of the types of adjectives presented here is
similar to many previous analyses of adjectives (Bolinger, 1967; Gross,
Fischer, & Miller, 1989; Levi, 1978; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976).
Semantically, there seem to be two kinds of adjectives. Most adjectives name
properties of things. Examples of adjectives of this kind include adjectives
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such as big, red, and clean. The adjectives in (11a,b) name a property of my
room. The other kind of adjectives do not name a property of things but help
identify certain kinds of things. Examples of this kind of adjective include
former, alleged and corporate(12a,b) These adjectives do not name a property
but help identify entities that are former lawyers, alleged lawyers and
corporate. The entities that are named by former lawyer and alleged lawyer
either are not lawyers or need not be lawyers and thus former and alleged
could not name a property of lawyers. Unlike the phrases alleged lawyer and
former lawyer, corporate lawyer necessarily names entities that are lawyers.
This leaves open the possibility that corporate names a property of lawyers. I
will argue in Section 2.3.2 that corporate does not name a property of things
in the way that adjectives like big, red, and clean do.
(1a) The big/red/clean room is mine.
(1b) My room is big/red/clean.
(12a) The former/alleged/corporate lawyer is ...
(12b) * The lawyer is former/alleged/corporate.
2.2.1 Adjectives that name properties of things.
Adjectives that name properties of things do so in a particular way;
they name the value that the entity named by the argument has on a given
dimension (Gross, Fischer, & Miller, 1989). This aspect of the semantics of
adjectives that name properties of things is reflected in the fact that most of
these adjectives can have opposites and can appear in comparative
constructions. In English most adjectives form their opposites through
affixation (e.g. happy/unhappy, legal/illegal, moral/immoral,
desirable/undesirable) though some adjectives like big/small have non-
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morphologically related opposites. Another property of adjectives that name
values on dimensions is that values on a dimension are mutually exclusive
and a given object can only have a single value on a dimension. Thus, a
given entity cannot be both big and small, wet and dry or male and female,
etc... This account of adjectives that name values on dimensions seems to be
undermined by the acceptability of sentences such as (13) and (14). In (13),
two values on the dimension are being predicated of the subject NP. In (14),
two values on the dimension COLOR are being used to modify the entities
named by house. If it is true that an entity cannot have more than a single
value on a dimension, then these sentences should be unacceptable. The
sentences actually are unacceptable unless one analyzes the words the house
or house as naming parts of a house. Thus, (13) and (14) are acceptable only if
they are interpreted in the same way as (13a) and (14a).
(13) The house is red and green.
(14) The red and green house ...
(13a) Parts of the house are red and parts of the house are green.
(14a) The house with red and green parts/stripes/spots...
This reinterpretation of what is being spoken about when the word
house is used is forced by the assumption that values on a dimension are
mutually exclusive. It is perfectly fine to predicate two properties of an entity
or modify a kind on the basis of values on two dimension. In these cases
there is no need to reinterpret what the noun is used to talk about. In fact
reinterpreting (15) and (16) as (15a) and (16a) is not legitimate.
Reinterpretation of conjunctive predicates and modifiers like the ones in (13)
and (14) is a consequence of the semantics of dimensions which does not
21
allow a single entity to have more than one value on a dimension. This rule
of reinterpretation is similar to the rules of construal proposed by Jackendoff
(1992).
(15) The house is red and expensive.
(16) The red and expensive house...
(15a) Parts of the house are red and parts of the house are expensive.
(16a) The house with red and expensive parts...
The fact that one is forced to re-interpret house in (14) shows that there
really is a constraint against an entity having two values on a given
dimension and so (13) and (14) actually present evidence for the single value
constraint rather than evidence against it. Further constraints on values on
dimensions will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Many of the adjectives that name values on a dimension, name values
on continuous dimensions such as HEIGHT. The continuity implies that the
dimension theoretically has an infinite number of values that could be
named. It is obviously not a reasonable option to have names for each of the
possible values on a continuous dimension. The manner in which languages
deal with this problem is to name values on continuous dimension in
relation to other values on the dimension rather than name particular
values. One way to do this is to compare two specific values on a dimension.
This leads to comparative constructions such as (17) and (18).
(17) Is this dog bigger or is that one?
(18) Which towel is wetter?
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A second way in which a given value on a continuous dimension can
be interpreted is with respect to a standard value. There are at least three
ways in which the standard for comparison can be determined. First, the
standard may be given by the kind in question. Thus, big dog in (19) means
big for a dog or bigger than the average sized dog or most dogs.
(19) A big dog bit me.
(20) The big dog ate the food.
(21) Elephants are big.
Secondly, the standard may be given by the context. In sentence (20),
big could mean the bigger of two dogs in the situation even though that dog
may be small in comparison to most dogs. Finally, the standard may be given
by consideration of values for other kinds; (21) expresses the fact that
elephants are larger than most animals or kinds of things one may normally
think about. This type of usage requires that the speaker and listener have a
compatible contrast set; if planets, stars and galaxies are included then it no
longer is true that elephants are big. For all three kinds of standards
mentioned above it is necessary to look at the variation of values of the given
dimension in order to determine the standard. What differs is which entities
enter into the computation of the standard.
2.2.2 Adjectives that name values on dimensions and their
arguments.
Adjectives that name properties of things semantically require an
argument to name the entity of which the adjective names the property.
How this argument is represented structurally is the subject matter of
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syntactic theory; Questions such as whether something is an internal or
external argument or whether the argument should be a sister of the
adjective cannot be answered by looking at the semantics of adjectives.
However, the fact that adjectives require an argument is due to the semantics
of adjectives. Note that adjectives name properties of things rather than
properties themselves. Properties themselves can be spoken about in the
abstract rather than as applying to any particular entity. For example, one can
talk about the fact that HEIGHT and WIDTH differ in the orientation on which
they are defined without considering any entity's height or width. This is
reflected in the fact that names for properties are nouns (e.g. height, width,
tallness and color) and do not require arguments.
In addition to semantically requiring an argument, many adjectives are
dependent on the argument for interpretation. For example, one cannot tell
whether an adjective such as big applies to an entity such as a rat unless one
knows what noun big is to apply to; if the entity is named as a rat then big
would apply if the entity was big for a rat. If, on the other hand, the entity
were named by the noun animal, then it would not be considered big because
even the biggest rats are not big animals. Determining whether the entity can
be called a rat, on the other hand, does not depend on its size with respect to
different categories (is it big for a rat, is it big for an animal etc...).
The last example showed that in order to determine whether the
adjective big applies to a particular entity one needs to know which noun the
entity is named by. It has been argued that while this is true for relative or
gradable adjectives such as big, the same is not true of absolute adjectives such
as red, male or dead. Absolute adjectives are said to allow inferences of the
following form (22).
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(22) X is a red book. X is a male dog.
All books are objects. All dogs are animals.
X is a red object. X is a male animal
This type of inference is not valid 2 for an adjective like big(23).
(23) X is a big book.
All books are objects.
#X is a big object.
The difference in the inferences supported by absolute and relative adjectives
can be attributed to absolute adjectives' invariance in interpretations with
different nouns.
The distinction between absolute and relative adjectives is conceptually
clear: the former are interpreted in the same manner no matter what
argument they take and the latter are interpreted only with respect to a
particular argument. It turns out, however, that there are very few, if any,
adjectives which are absolute. Color terms are often given as examples of
absolute adjectives but it turns out that they are both graded and context
dependent. Color terms are graded as can be seen from the fact that they
appear in comparative constructions such as (24). In addition to being graded,
color terms are also context dependent: the colors which count as red for an
apple, for hair and for the sky are very different colors. Similarly, white and
black skin are quite different in color from white or black paper.
(24) Which apple is redder?
2 1 will use the symbol # to indicate that an inference does not follow.
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The context dependence of putatively absolute adjectives is best
illustrated in the inferences that are licensed. One kind of evidence that has
been offered for the context independence of absolute adjectives is that
absolute adjectives support inferences of the form illustrated in (22). It turns
out, however, that this type of inference is valid for only some noun contexts.
For example, inferences using the adjectives male and dead in (25) are not
valid.
(25) X is a dead dog. X is a male dog.
All dogs are physical objects. All dogs are physical objects.
#X is a dead physical object. #X is a male physical object
(26) X is a black dog.
All dogs are physical objects.
X is a black physical object
The reason these inferences are not valid is that the properties named by
male and dead do not apply to entities conceptualized as physical objects.
Thus, even though a dead dog can be thought of as a physical object, it cannot
be thought of as a dead object. Note that if an adjective names a property of
dogs that can also be a property of physical objects, then the inference is fine
(26). These facts indicate that even absolute adjectives are dependent on the
noun to be interpreted. While the intersection of dead things and physical
objects is well defined and not null (unlike the intersection of pregnant
things and tables), dead cannot modify physical object. The anomaly has to be
attributed to factors related to semantic interpretation because the sentences
are syntactically well formed.
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The preceding discussion has argued that the meanings of adjectives
require arguments and that the arguments are also needed for the
interpretation of most adjectives. Given the role of nouns in the
interpretation of adjectives, it is important to analyze the ways in which
adjectives and nouns interact semantically.
2.2.3 How adjectives combine with nouns semantically
Adjectives that name values on a dimension combine semantically
with nouns in two ways: (i) Adjectives can predicate properties of the entity
named by the subject NP, (ii) Adjectives can modify the kind named by the
noun. The second type of adjectives combine with nouns to pick out a kind.
2.2.3.1 Predication
One of the ways in which adjectives that name values on a dimension
semantically combine with nouns is by predication. In predication, an entity
is stated to have the value named by the adjective on the relevant dimension.
For example, sentence (27) states that a particular individual of the kind DOG
has a value named by the adjective big on the dimension SIZE. The entities of
which an adjective is predicated are specified independently of their value on
the relevant dimension. Thus, the size of the dog is not relevant to how the
dog being talked about in (27) is picked out. In addition to sentences like (27),
there are other types of sentences which have the same predication
relationship between the adjective and the noun. Examples of such sentences
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are sentences with relative clauses (28), resultatives (29), depictives (30), and
appositives (31).
(27) That dog is big.
(28) The dog that is big is mine.
(29) John scrubbed the table clean.
(30) John ate the meat raw.
(31) The flat table was a perfect place for the computer.
The adjectives in sentences (27)-(31) do not play a role in specifying which
entities are being picked out. The adjectives are naming the value that the
entities named by the subjects are said to have. Sentences (29) and (30) have
semantics that relate the adjectives to the verbs in different ways. In (29), the
direct object of the verb comes to have the property named by the adjective
due to the action named by the verb being performed on the entity which is
the direct object. In (30), the direct object of the verb has the property named
by the adjective at the time of the action named by the verb. Despite this
difference in the manner in which the adjectives and verbs are related
semantically, both these sentences a predication relationship between the
adjective and the noun. Finally, sentence (31) is likely to be interpreted as an
appositive under normal circumstances and can be paraphrased as (32). This
is clearly a predicative use of the adjective flat; the adjective names a value on
a dimension and does not play a role in specifying which table is being talked
about.
(32) The table which happens to be flat is a perfect place for the computer.
28
2.2.3.2 Modification
Adjectives that name values on a dimension can also be used to
modify the entities picked out by the noun. Modification is the specification
of individuals of the kind named by the noun on the basis of the value
named by the adjective. In a sentence like (33), the noun dog is used to talk
about individual dogs and the adjective big names some values on the
dimension SIZE. Each of the individual dogs has one value on the
dimension SIZE and the adjective and noun combine to name those dogs that
have a value on the dimension SIZE which is named by the adjective big.
Unlike predication, in modification the adjective plays a role in specifying
which entities are being talked about.
(33) I like big dogs.
I want to distinguish my use of the term modification from the notion
of restriction which is often used to talk about various kinds of modifiers
(Siegal, 1980). Restrictive modifiers are those which help pick out a subset of
the entities named by the noun they are modifying. Restrictive modifiers
include prenominal adjectives and other manners of restricting the subject
including relative clauses. Modification, is a special case of restriction, one in
which the value on a dimension is used to pick out which entities are being
spoken about. As will be seen, there are important ways in which
modification and other types of restriction differ. The expressions that can
name a value on a dimension are a subset of the expressions that can be used
to restrict the range of entities being spoken about. Restriction is a purely
semantic notion that does not make reference to any particular structural
relation between the restrictive expression and the expression being restricted.
29
Modification, on the other hand, is defined in terms of a particular structural
relation that holds between adjectives and the noun they are modifying. In
English, modificational adjectives occur prenominally.
2.2.3.3 Adjectives that combine with nouns to name kinds.
In addition to adjectives that name values on a dimension, there are a
small number of adjectives that combine with nouns to name kinds of
things. Examples of adjectives like this are alleged, former and corporate. As
discussed above, adjectives like alleged and former cannot name values on
dimensions of the entities named by the noun with which they combine
because the entities named by phrases like alleged NOUN or former NOUN
cannot or do not have to be entities of the kind named by the noun. While
this is the case for adjectives like alleged and former, it is not for adjectives
like corporate. Adjectives like corporate always combine with a noun to
name a subset of the entities named by the noun. In the present analysis,
adjectives like big differ from corporate in that big is said to modify a kind
when it appears in prenominal position but corporate helps picks out a kind
when combined with a noun. The question that arises is why can't adjectives
like corporate modify a noun?
Modification is proposed to be the specification of entities named by the
argument on the basis of the value named by adjective. Given this, the
question of why adjectives like corporate cannot modify nouns can be
reformulated as why can't these adjectives name values on a dimension.
Recall that values on a dimension are mutually exclusive and a given entity
can have only one value on any dimension. It is unclear, however, on what
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dimension corporate could name a value. A plausible hypothesis would be
the dimension TYPE, since corporate lawyers are a type of lawyer and there are
other types of lawyers like criminal lawyers and family lawyers and tax
lawyers. The problem with such a proposal is that the putative values
criminal, tax, and family are not mutually exclusive; a given lawyer could be
all these types of lawyers. It seems like an entity named by a phrase like
corporate lawyer is not restricted form having any adjective that names a
value from modifying it; a corporate lawyer can also be tall, short, happy, sad,
etc...
The distinction between prenominal adjectives that name values on
dimensions and prenominal adjectives that help name a kind of thing is
supported by a number of linguistic phenomena. First, unlike adjectives that
name values on dimensions, adjectives that help name a kind of thing
cannot appear as predicates (34),(35). This is because adjectives that appear as
predicates state something about the entity named by the subject and do not
help determine which entities are named by the subject. It follows that
adjectives that help name a kind of thing should not be able to appear as
predicates (35). Note that adjectives that help name kinds of things can
appear in predicates (36), they just cannot appear as predicates themselves
because they help name kinds of things and the predicate does not help
determine what is being spoken about in a sentence like (35).
(34) John is tall.
(35) *John is corporate.
(36) John is a corporate lawyer.
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Second, big and corporate combine with other prenominal adjectives
in different ways. In English, when there is more than one prenominal
adjective there is a preferred order in which the adjectives occur (more on
this in Chapter 4). While the order in (37) is preferred, the order in (38) is
acceptable in contexts in which there are some big bats and some small bats
and of the big bats some are red while others aren't. One can always construct
a context in which one can change the preferred order of adjectives such as big
and red but the same is not true for adjectives such as corporate as can be seen
in (39). This difference is predicted if adjectives such as tall do not name a
kind of thing when combines with a noun but adjectives such as corporate
do. The relationship of corporate lawyer to lawyer is more like the
relationship of cocker spaniel to dog than small dog to dog.
(37) The big red bat.
(38) The red big bat.
(39) The tall corporate lawyer. / *The corporate tall lawyer.
Third, when adjectives that name values on a dimension modify a
noun, they always combine with the noun to pick out a subset of the entities
named by the noun. This is not the case with adjectives that combine with
nouns to pick out a kind. Adjectives such as alleged and former do not pick
out a subset of the entities named by the noun with which they combine but
an adjective such as corporate does pick out a subset. The reason for the
difference between adjectives that name values on a dimension and those
that help pick out a kind is that the adjectives that name values on
dimensions are constrained to name properties of the kind named by the
noun whereas adjectives which do not name values on a dimension are not
32
gas_---
so constrained. Fourth, adjectives that combine with nouns to pick out a
kind of thing cannot be nominalized whereas adjectives that name values on
dimensions can (Levi, 1978). For example, nervous has the nominalization
nervousness when it is used to name a property as in (40) but cannot be
nominalized when it combines with nouns to pick out a kind (41).
(40) The nervous man... / The nervousness of the man...
(41) The nervous disorder... / *the nervousness of the disorder...
A final difference is that adjectives that combine with nouns to pick
out kinds MUST be discrete (42). The same is not true of adjectives that
modify a noun (43). The condition that adjectives that help pick out kinds be
discrete makes sense because there should be some set of conditions which
would make an entity a member of the subkind and membership in a kind is
not a graded concept. Thus relative adjectives such as big do not combine
with the noun to pick out a subkind.
(42) The corporate lawyer. / *The more corporate lawyer.
(43) The big house. / The bigger house.
This leaves open the possibility that discrete adjectives such as dead
which are not relative but can appear both prenominally and predicatively
help pick out a kind when in prenominal position. I would argue that they
do not because adjectives such as dead pattern with the relative adjectives in
that they can appear in both prenominal and predicate positions and they do
not combine with adjectives that help name kinds of things as can be seen in
(44) (Levi, 1978).
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(44) *The dead and corporate lawyer.
As mentioned above, adjectives like corporate do not name a value on
a dimension and thus cannot appear as predicates (35). Note that some of the
adjectives that combine to name a kind of thing are homophonous with
adjectives that name values on dimensions. An example of such an adjective
is criminal which can appear prenominally as well as predicatively (45). It's
prenominal use can be modificational or it may help name a kind of thing.
The reading that allows one to name a kind of thing cannot appear in
predicate position (46).
(45) The criminal action was.... / The action was criminal.
(46) The criminal lawyer was hungry. *The lawyer was criminal.
2.3 Semantic knowledge of adjectives and how they combine with
nouns.
To summarize, I have motivated a semantic analysis of adjectives in
which there are two kinds of adjectives. The first kind of adjectives name
properties of things. These adjectives name values along dimensions. A
dimension is proposed to consist of a set of mutually exclusive values.
Adjectives that name values on dimensions are proposed to combine with
nouns in two ways. In predication, these adjectives name the value that the
entity named by the subject has on the relevant dimension. In modification,
the value named by the adjective is used to pick out the objects of the kind
named by its argument. The second type of adjectives are those that do not
name values on dimensions but combine with nouns to pick out kinds of
things. In the rest of this thesis I will show how this knowledge of the
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semantics of adjectives can explain a number of linguistic and
psycholinguistic facts as well as motivate heuristics for the acquisition of
adjective meanings.
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Chapter 3
Modification
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will show how the semantics of modification can be
used to explain a number of restrictions on structures and how they are
interpreted. In the previous chapter, it was proposed that adjectives that
name values on a dimension interact with nouns in two ways. In
predication, adjectives state the value a given entity is said to have on the
dimension on which the adjective names values. The adjective does not play
a role in determining which entities are being spoken about. In modification,
the value named by the adjective is used to help specify which entities are
being spoken about. Whereas in English, modificational adjectives occur
prenominally, the exact syntactic structure that represents this semantic
relation is not relevant for the purposes of the present analysis. What is
important here is that there is a structural relation between adjectives and
nouns which can be interpreted as modification and that this structural
relation is different from the relation that holds between an adjective and a
noun when the adjective is predicating information about the entities named
by the noun. An example of a modificational adjective is given in (47). In
this sentence, the value named by big is used to identify which table is being
spoken about.
(47) The big table is mine.
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3.2 Restriction against the modification of single entities.
Because modification uses the value named by an adjective to
determine which entities are being spoken about, it follows that it should not
be possible for an adjective to modify expressions that are used to name single
entities. This prediction receives support from the ungrammaticality of
sentences (48)-(50).
(48) * Big [the dog]NP is hungry.
(49) * Big [Fido]NP is hungry.
(50) * Big [he]NP is hungry.
In each of (48)-(50), there is only one entity being named by the NP1 and thus
the value the entity has on the dimension cannot be used to identify what is
being spoken about.
3.3 Semantics of plural NPs and modification.
While the semantics of modification may be able to explain the
ungrammaticality of (48)-(50), it seems that it will be unable to explain why
sentences (51)-(53) are ungrammatical because in each of these sentences,
more than one entity is being spoken about and yet the adjective cannot
modify the expression used to talk about a number of entities. This suggests
that the reason why (48)-(50) are ungrammatical is because of a syntactic
restriction on adjectives occurring in a structural position which would allow
modification of an NP. While this is a possibility, I would like to argue that
the semantics of plural NPs prevent them from being modified.
For the purpose at hand, it does not matter whether one adopts a DP analysis or not.
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(51) * Big [the dogs]Np are hungry.
(52) * Big [some dogs]Np are hungry.
(53) * Big [all dogs]Np are hungry.
Plural noun phrases such as the dogs, some dogs and all dogs usually
can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is a distributive
interpretation. In the distributive interpretation, the noun phrase can be
rewritten as a conjunction of all the entities named by the noun. For
example, the distributive interpretation of (54) is that each of the dogs named
by the NP the dogs (dog1 , dog 2, ... , dogn) is hungry (55). In the distributive
interpretation, one entity is being spoken about at a time and each of those
entities has only one value on a given dimension and thus cannot be
modified. This explains why (51)-(53) are ungrammatical.
(54) The dogs are hungry.
(55) Dog, is hungry, and dog 2 is hungry, and......, dogn is hungry.
The second type of interpretation of plural noun phrases is a collective
interpretation. In a collective interpretation, one is talking about the entities
named by the noun as a single entity. For example, it is the dogs as a single
entity that are making a lot of noise in (56), rather than each dog individually.
It may be the case that each dog individually is also making a lot of noise but
in the collective reading it is the group of dogs as a single entity that is
making the noise. Because the collective interpretation of an NP treats the
entities picked out by the noun as a single entity, the NP itself cannot be
modified.
(56) The dogs were making a lot of noise.
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A collective interpretation of an NP is used to speak about a particular
or unique set. While it is true that a given NP can be used to talk about many
different sets of dogs, it can be used to talk about only one particular set of
dogs in a given context. For example, even though the NP the dogs can be
used to talk about many different sets of dogs, it is used to talk about a
particular set of dogs in (56) and not any of the other sets that the dogs could
have been used to talk about.
Evidence for the claim that NPs pick out a unique set of entities named
by the noun comes from the fact that one cannot quantify NPs. In each of
(57)-(59) it is perfectly possible to count the dogs but it is not possible to count
the particular set that the NP is used to talk about.
(57) * How many the dog(s) are in the room?
(58a) There are some dogs in the kitchen and some dogs in the bathroom.
(58b) * There are two some dogs in the house.
(58c) There are two sets of dogs in the house.
(59) * Is this the same the dog I saw yesterday?
Because the collective interpretation of NPs is used to talk about a
particular set, one cannot modify NPs. One can, however, predicate
adjectives of collective NPs (56). This is because predicating information does
not require there to be more than one value on a dimension and thus more
than one entity. Distributive NPs cannot be modified because they are used to
talk about single individuals one at a time.
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3.4 Semantic vs syntactic restrictions on prenominal adjectives.
The preceding discussion has provided a semantic explanation for why
it is not possible for adjectives to modify NPs. NPs are used to talk about a
particular set of entities or about particular individuals one at a time and
thus cannot be modified. The question arises whether there is any reason to
prefer the semantic explanation to a syntactic explanation. It is possible that
the semantic generalization about NPs is a consequence of a syntactic
restriction and that the semantic restriction does not have any independent
motivation. Alternately, the semantic restriction that is used to explain the
restriction on adjectives modifying NPs is independently motivated. In the
following sections I will argue that the semantics of modification which are
used to explain why adjectives cannot modify NPs are also needed to explain
restrictions on where adjectives can occur within an NP and that the
restrictions on modification also predict how prenominal adjectives are
interpreted.
3.4.1 Restrictions on adjectives within an NP.
In addition to the restriction on adjectives modifying NPs, there are
also some restrictions on where an adjective can occur within an NP. For
example, (60) is perfectly acceptable, but (61) is not even though the adjective
occurs within the NP. The explanation for why (61) is ungrammatical is that
the phrase three dogs, like an NP, is used distributively to talk about three
dogs one at a time or to talk about a particular set of dogs and thus cannot be
modified for the same reason that adjectives cannot modify NPs. Note that
the sentence would be grammatical if one could construe the phrase three
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dogs as naming an individual of a kind. This would allow the adjective big to
modify. A context in which (61) may be regarded as grammatical is one in
which dogs come in triples and these triples are called three dogs and these
triplets of dogs vary in size. It may be argued that because there are contexts
in which sentences like (61) are grammatical, there is no restrictions on
adjectives modifying phrases inside NPs, only strong biases against adjectives
modifying number phrases in an NP. It turns out, however, that sentences
like (62) and (64) are ungrammatical in any context.
(60) The three big dogs are hungry.
(61) * The big three dogs are hungry.
(62) * The big one dog is hungry.
(63) The fastest big dog is hungry.
(64) * The big fastest dog is hungry.
The ungrammaticality of (62) and (64) is due to the fact that the phrase
one dog and fastest dog necessarily name a single dog and thus cannot be
modified. The ungrammaticality of sentences (62) and (64) provides further
evidence that there are restrictions on structure that are due to the properties
of modification and that the properties of modification can account for
restrictions on the positions of adjectives within NPs as well as why
adjectives cannot modify NPs.
3.4.2 Interpreting adjectives as being modificational.
In addition to explaining the restriction on adjectives preceding NPs
and restrictions on where an adjective can occur inside an NP, the semantics
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of modification also predict when an adjective may be interpreted as
modifying a noun and when it has to be interpreted otherwise.
While it is true that having more than one entity is a necessary
condition for modification to occur, it is not a sufficient condition. For
modification to occur there have to be at least two values on the dimension
on which modification is taking place. If all the entities named by the
argument of the adjective have the same value on the dimension being
modified then modification cannot take place. This is because it is not
possible to pick out an entity of the kind named by the noun on the basis of
the value named by the adjective on the relevant dimension if all the entities
named by the noun have the same value. An example of such a situation is
given in (65). Under most circumstances, the adjective flat cannot be taken to
be modifying table because all tables are flat. The adjective is interpreted as an
appositive and the meaning of (65) corresponds to that of (66). Another
example of adjectives being interpreted appositively is nicknames (67). A
nickname like Big Jim in (67) has it's origins in a statement such as (68).
(65) The flat table is the best place to put the computer.
(66) The table which happens to be flat is the best place for the computer.
(67) Big Jim is a helpful fellow.
(68) Jim, who is big, is a helpful fellow.
Given that a prenominal adjective can be interpreted as an appositive
when there is no more than one value represented on the dimension to be
modified, the question arises as to why this isn't possible when an adjective
precedes an NP? The difference between NPs in English and proper names
and nouns is that NPs are used to talk about an individual, a single set
(collective reading of plural NPs) or a number of individuals one at a time
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(distributive reading of plural NPs). Each of these uses of an NP precludes it
from the possibility of modification. Furthermore, it is not necessary to know
which noun is the head of the NP or what its relation is to the adjective. The
impossibility of modification is due to the semantics of NPs rather than
nonlinguistic knowledge regarding the particular kinds of entities named by
the noun and what value the entities usually have on the dimension named
by the adjective.
The decision regarding when an adjective preceding a proper name or
a noun should be interpreted appositively depends on one's knowledge of the
context and nonlinguistic knowledge about the entities named by the noun or
proper name. For example, one can only know that flat has to interpreted
appositively in (65) if one knows that tables usually do not vary in flatness. It
is for this reason that one cannot predict whether flat should be interpreted in
a modificational manner or not in (69). On the other hand, it is clear that flat
could not be modificational in (70) even though one does not know the
meaning of blicket. Furthermore, there is no context in which flat could be
interpreted in a modificational manner in (70).
(69) The flat blicket is a good place to put the computer.
(70) * Flat the blicket is a good place to put the computer.
Unlike NPs, proper names can be modified given the proper context
(71). It is perfectly acceptable to modify a proper name when there is more
than one individual with the same proper name. The reason why one
usually interprets adjectives preceding proper names as appositives is that in
most contexts, a proper names picks out a single individual of a given kind.
This uniqueness is a pragmatic assumption and is not a semantic property of
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proper names because proper names can be quantified (72)-(73). Recall that
one cannot quantify NPs (74)-(75).
(71) Big John is an engineer and little John is a doctor.
(72) How many Johns are in this class?
(73) I knew two Johns in third grade.
(74) * How many the boys are in this class?
(75) * I knew two some boys in third grade.
The fact that an appositive interpretation is only possible in those
contexts in which modification is possible (e.g. (69)) and not in contexts in
which modification is not possible (e.g. (70)) suggests that the default
interpretation of the prenominal adjective is modificational.
3.5 Cross-linguistic variation in restrictions on prenominal
adjectives.
The definition of modification given in Chapter 2 was the specification
of entities of the kind named by the noun on the basis of the value on the
dimension named by the adjective. Given that this is a semantic definition, it
should not be subject to cross-linguistic variation. The restrictions that arise
from modification should be the same across languages. Thus, it should only
be possible for an adjective to modify expressions which are used to speak
about at least two entities which have different values on the dimension
being modified.
Japanese seems to provide counter-examples to the explanation given
here. In Japanese, it seems that it is possible to modify words that are
translated in English as he and this.
(76) kierei-na ko-no hana
'pretty this flower'
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(77) Kinoo Taroo-ni atta ka-i?
'Did you meet Taro yesterday?'
Un, demo kinoo-no kare-wa sukosi yoosu-ga hendat-ta.
'Yes, but yesterday's he was somewhat strange.'
(Fukui & Speas, 1987)
(78) ookii kare
'big he'
Though these sentences seem to provide counter-evidence to the explanation
of the semantics of modification given here, it turns out that they do not. In
none of (76)-(78) does the putative modifier modify the noun.2 (76) and (78)
are interpreted appositively and cannot be used to identify an entity on the
basis of the value named by the adjective. Similarly, (77) has the same
meaning as when kinoo-no doesn't have a genetive marker, indicating that
kinoo-no is not modifying kare-wa. Thus these examples are consistent with
the analysis of modification that states that it is not possible to modify
expressions that name a single entity. One difference between Japanese and
English is that adjectives can appear before pronouns and demonstratives in
Japanese but not in English. Fukui and Speas (1986) suggest that lexical
categories project to X' rather than X" as is the case in English. This difference
in the projection of lexical categories may account for the fact that modifiers
can precede expressions which are XPs in English. This syntactic difference
may also have subtle semantic consequences but one would have perform
careful investigation to determine if this is indeed the case.
In sum, it is predicted that the restrictions on modification are
universal and putative counterexamples are likely to be interpreted as
2 1 am grateful to Shigeru Miyagawa and Daishi Harada for these judgements.
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appositives or have a different structural relation than the relation that holds
between adjectives and nouns that are interpreted as being modificational.
3.6 Summary
The present chapter has shown how the semantics of modification can
be used to explain a number of constraints on syntactic structure and also be
used to predict when a prenominal adjective has to be interpreted
appositively. The semantic of modification provide a motivation for why the
structure of DP is as it is. It may turn out that there are other, syntactic,
reasons why adjectives cannot precede DPs in English but the existence of
these syntactic explanations does not in itself pose a problem for the semantic
constraint proposed here. It is quite possible for a given structure to be
unacceptable because it violates a number of constraints (e.g. the case filter
and ECP). The semantic explanation was motivated for independent reasons
and can explain why adjectives cannot modify certain N-bars (ones that
necessarily name only one entity e.g. fastest dog, one dog), when prenominal
adjectives are to be interpreted as appositives and restrictions on adjective
ordering. The manner in which structural relations are semantically
interpreted provides a source of constraint on possible structures and may
lead to the simplification of syntactic theories. Furthermore, semantic
constraints of this sort may be able to explain certain aspects of syntactic
structure that are usually left unexplained. For example, the constraints on
modification may help explain why APs do not dominate DPs.
In sum, the proposal that there may be constraints on structures due to
the manner in which they are interpreted does not imply that there are
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constraints on syntactic structure that are independent of the constraints
imposed by the manner in which certain structural relations are interpreted.
Furthermore, the semantic analysis is crucially dependent on structural
notions and so it should not be seen as a proposal that is inconsistent with
syntactic theories. In the next chapter, I will look at how the semantics of
modification can be used to explain the ordering of multiple adjectives.
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Chapter 4
Adjective Ordering
4.1 Introduction.
The analysis of adjectives presented in Chapter 2 states that
adjectives that name values on dimensions can be used to predicate
information about the subject or they can be used to pick out entities named
by the noun on the basis of the value named by the adjective. In the
predicative use, adjectives name the value the entity in question has on a
particular dimension. The adjectives that are predicated of the entity do not
play any role in deciding which entities are being spoken about. In the
modificational use, however, the adjectives do play a role in deciding which
entities are being spoken about.
Entities named by nouns have many dimensions on which they
have values. It follows that it should be possible to predicate more than one
adjective of entity and it should also be possible to decide which entities are
being spoken about on the basis of values on more than one dimension. This
is in fact the case as can be seen in (79) and (80).
(79) The dog in the corner is big and furry.
(80) I want the big and furry dog.
4.2 Types of modification.
In (79), the adjectives are naming the values the dog in the corner
has on the dimensions SIZE and FURRINESS. In (80), the values named by big
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and furry are used to specify which dogs are wanted. Note that in the two
sentences given above, both big and furry name values on dimensions of
members of the kind DOG. The determination of the values on the
dimensions SIZE and FURRINESS depend on the kind DOG and are
independent of each other. When an adjective modifies a noun in a manner
in which values other dimensions cannot affect values on other dimensions,
then the modification is said do be parallel modification.
In addition to parallel modification, two or more adjectives can
modify sequentially. An example of sequential modification is given in (81).
(81) I want the big furry dog.
In (81), big can modify the entities named by furry dog rather than the entities
named by dog; If the range of sizes for dogs is different than the range of sizes
for furry dogs, then the entities picked out by the NP will differ when the
modification is sequential. Unlike the case of parallel modification, the
values on the two dimensions are not independent of each other; what
counts as big can be affected by values on the FURRINESS dimension.
4.3 Constraints on adjective ordering.
The possibility of non-parallel modification means that there has to
be some way in which a language encodes the order in which modification is
to occur. In English, the order of non-parallel modification is encoded in the
serial order in which adjectives appear in prenominal constructions. The
semantics of adjectives and modification offer an explanation for (i) why
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there has to be an ordering of adjectives, (ii) why the ordering is what it is,
and (iii) why alternate orders are acceptable in certain contexts.
As discussed above, one reason the order of adjectives modifying a
noun in a non-parallel manner must be specified is the entities named by the
NP may differ depending on that order. A second reason why the order of
modification is important is that modification along a given dimension is
only possible if there is more than one value on the dimension in the set of
entities being modified. For example, big can modify red bats in (82), only if
red bats vary in size. If it turns out that all the red bats are of the same size,
big cannot function as a modifier in (82); it would function as an appositive.
Similarly, red can only modify big bats in (83) if the big bats that are being
spoken about vary in color.
(82) big red bats
(83) red big bats
Because different orders of modification can lead to different
entities being picked out it is also likely that different orders of modification
will pick out different numbers of entities. In some cases, one of the orders
may not name any entities. This would be the case in (82) if none of the red
bats could be considered big. Similarly, no entities would be picked out by (83)
if none of the big bats are red. If no entities are named by an expression, then
it trivially doesn't allow for any further modification. For example, if there
are no big bats that are red, 1 then one certainly cannot talk about the
1 Positing that there are red big bats in some context does not mean that one can modify the term
used to name them. One would only be able to modify the term used to name red big bats if they
showed variation on some dimension.
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expensive red big bats in contexts in which expensive modifies red big bats.2
This implies is that there is a constraint on the order of modification which
would require that:
(I) The order of two modifiers is such that if one ordering leads to no
entities being picked out and the other does not, then the order that
does not pick out any entities is disallowed and the order that does
pick out some entities is allowed.
Of course there will be many pairs of modifiers for which both orderings will
result in some entities being picked out. How should one decide between
these possible orderings? I return to this question below but I first discuss
other constraints on the ordering of sequentially modifying adjectives.
Clearly, one cannot modify an expression that does not name
anything. Also, one cannot modify a single entity. As discussed above, a
single entity has only one value on each of its dimensions and thus cannot be
modified. This is the reason why sentences such as (84) are ungrammatical.
Recall that modification can also fail when more than one entity is named by
the argument but all the entities have the same value on the dimension in
question. This is why flat fails to modify table in (85) and is interpreted as an
appositive in normal circumstances. To summarize, for modification to be
possible there have to be at least two entities being considered that do not
have the same value on the dimension being modified.
(84) * The big one dog is mine.
(85) The flat table is mine.
2 It is important to note that when I say there are no entities of a given kind I am not making a
claim about the world but rather about the mental model with which one is operating. Mental
models may be of actual or counterfactual situations.
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The likelihood of two entities having the same value on a
dimension is a function of the number of different values there are on that
dimension. If there are a greater number of values on Dimension A than
Dimension B, then it is more likely that two entities picked at random will
have different values on Dimension A than on Dimension B. This implies
that one should modify along Dimension B before one modifies on
Dimension A. This is because given that A has more values than B, the
likelihood that there will be more than one value of A represented after
modification on B, is greater than the likelihood that there will be more than
one value of B represented after modification on A. This suggests the
following constraint on the order of modification.
(II) If Dimension A has a greater number of values than Dimension B,
then one should modify along Dimension B before modifying along
Dimension A.
This constraint on sequential modification states that the order in which
adjectives occur will be constrained by the number of values there are on the
dimensions in the context being considered. Note that continuous
dimensions such as SIZE and TEXTURE have an infinite number of values but
they differ in that at some point a surface will become too uneven to be called
rough but an object can never become large enough such that the adjective
big would no longer apply. This is why SIZE precedes TEXTURE even though
they are both continuous dimensions.
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Constraint (II), is proposed to be a constraint on the ordering of
sequential modification by adjectives. 3 If the constraint is in fact a constraint
on adjectives that modify sequentially rather than a more general constraint
on adjective ordering, then it should be possible to violate the constraint on
ordering when modification is parallel rather than sequential. Similarly, if
adjectives are not modificational, then they should not be subject to the
constraint on the ordering of sequential modificational adjectives. In the rest
of the chapter I will present evidence supporting the analysis presented here
and I will also review previous proposals for constraints on adjective
ordering and how the proposals are related to the current proposal.
4.4 Ordering of modificational adjectives.
As mentioned above, there is a particular order in which
prenominal adjectives typically appear when there is more than one
prenominal adjective in English. For example, the order in (86) is natural
and the one in (87) is odd except in a most contexts. In (86), big modifies (at
least in some cases) red plastic bat rather than bat; thus, the big red plastic bat
may be relatively small for a bat and yet big for red plastic bats.
(86) I want the big red plastic bats.
(87) I want the plastic big red bats.
3 Because constraint (11) is a constraint on the ordering of sequential modification, it applies
only to adjectives that name values on dimensions. Ordering constraints on adjectives that help
name kinds of things (e.g. former corporate lawyer/*corporate former lawyer) will have to be
explained in some other way.
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Sproat and Shih (1986) provide cross-linguistic evidence from a
range of languages 4 showing that if a language allows direct (sequential)
modification then the order of the modifiers is the same as in English. In
addition, they showed that the constraints on the order of modifiers does not
hold when the modification is not direct. Sproat and Shih's data from
Mokilese and Thai shows that distance from the head noun is what is
relevant to ordering rather than linear order. This finding is supported by
Martin's (1969) data on the ordering of post nominal adjectives in
Indonesian.
4.5 Non-canonical orderings.
Constraint (II) orders adjectives on the basis of the number of
values on a dimension. A prediction that follows from this constraint is that
non-canonical adjective orders should be possible if one considers contexts in
which the number of values on the relevant dimensions does not correspond
to the number values usually represented on the dimensions in question.
For example, it may be the case that in a given context there are more values
on Dimension B than on A even though in general Dimension A has more
values. In this context it would be appropriate to have the adjective ordering
BA even though the standard ordering is AB.
The prediction that non-canonical adjective orders should be
possible if one considers contexts in which the number of values on the
relevant dimensions does not correspond to the number values usually
represented on the dimensions in question is borne out in sentences like (24).
4 The languages that they studied were English, Mandarin, Japanese, Greek, Kannada, Arabic,
French, Thai, Mokilese, and Irish.
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This sentence is acceptable in contexts in which the range of variation of
values on the dimensions being considered is different from the amount of
variation which is found on those dimensions in general. Specifically, it is
okay to say plastic big red bat in contexts where there is variation in the type
of material of which bats are made but the size and color of the bats is held
constant (Danks & Glucksberg, 1971). Thus (87) would be appropriate if one
wanted to pick the plastic bat out of big red bats in a context in which what
counts as big for a red bat is different from what counts as big for a plastic bat
or a red plastic bat.
4.6 Ordering of non-modificational adjectives.
The previous section provided evidence that when there is more
than one adjective modifying in a sequential mannner in English, the
ordering of the adjectives is subject to constraint (II). If the constraint is a
constraint on the ordering of sequential modificational adjectives rather than
a more general constraint on adjective ordering it should follow that
adjectives that do not have a modificational role or modify in a parallel
manner should not be subject to this constraint. The current section presents
evidence that the constraints due to the nature of sequential modification are
not present in the ordering of non-modificational adjectives and parallel
modifiers in English.
The most obvious instance of non-modificational adjectives are
adjectives that appear in predicate position as in (88) and (89). Both orders of
the adjectives are equally acceptable and it seems that considerations of focus
determine which of the adjectives is mentioned first. Crucially,
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Iconsiderations of the number of values on the various dimensions does not
determine whether a given ordering of adjectives is acceptable or not.
(88) That bat is big, red, and plastic.
(89) That bat is plastic, red, and big.
Another context in which adjectives are non-modificational is
when they are applied to proper names. Because proper names usually
cannot be modified, the adjectives are interpreted as appositives and the order
of the adjectives is determined by considerations other than those relevant to
modification, possibly considerations of focus or salience (90)-(91). The
number of values on the dimensions in question represented in the current
context cannot be relevant to the ordering of the adjectives because a given
individual can only have one value on each dimension.
(90) Big Old Jim is coming this way.
(91) Old Big Jim is coming this way.
Finally, another manner in which English indicates that
prenominal adjectives are not modifying sequentially is in the phonology.
Prenominal adjectives which have pauses between them are interpreted in
either a parallel modificational manner (Beckman & Pierrehumbert, 1986) or
as appositives. This is illustrated in (92) and (93).
(92) The big, red, plastic bat is mine.
(93) The plastic, big, red bat is mine.
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4.7 Other accounts of adjective ordering.
Previous research on the constraints on the ordering of prenominal
adjectives has suggested that various semantic (Bever, 1970; Danks &
Glucksberg, 1971; Martin, 1969; Sproat & Shih, 1986), syntactic (Annear, 1964;
Vendler, 1968) and processing variables (Bever, 1970; Martin, 1968; Crain &
Hamburger, 1992) may be relevant. In the current section I review these
proposals and how they relate to the proposal being made in this chapter.
Bever (1970) proposes a processing explanation for the ordering of
prenominal adjectives in English. He observes that the order of prenominal
adjectives is such that the closer the adjective is to the noun the more
"nounlike" it is. The more "substantive" or "concrete" the quality that an
adjective refers to, the more "nounlike" the adjective is. Following Vendler
(1968), Bever argues that adjectives that name substances such as plastic are
more "nounlike" than color adjectives like red in that substance terms occur
in more constructions as nouns than do color terms. In support of this claim
he offers the following type of evidence showing that substance adjectives are
more "nounlike" than color adjectives and that red is more "nounlike" than
large.
(94) a) Red is a color; redness is nice.
b) Plastic is a substance; plasticity is nice.
c) *That is made out of red.
d) That is made out of plastic.
e) *The red broke.
f) The plastic broke.
g) ?Reds are of variable quality.
h) Plastics are of variable quality.
(95) a) Red is my favorite: color.
b) *Large is my favorite size.
c) He splattered some red on me.
d) *He splattered some large on me.
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e) Red and blue and green are colors.
f) ?Large and enormous and tiny are sizes. (Bever, 1970; pg 324-25)
Bever argues that the ordering of prenominal adjectives in terms of
"nounlikeness" is due to a perceptual strategy that is used to segment
sentences. Specifically, one can tell that the noun phrase is complete as soon
as one encounters a word which is less "nounlike" than the previous word.
There are a number of problems with this proposal, however. First, the
proposal does not give an account for why alternate orderings of sequentially
modificational adjectives are sometimes acceptable and the contexts in which
they are acceptable. Second, the proposal does not give an account for why it
is possible to violate the canonical ordering of adjectives if the adjectives are
modifying the noun in parallel rather than sequentially. Finally, the notion
of "nounlikeness" does not seem to play a role in explaining any other
linguistic phenomenon. Furthermore, the strategy cannot be used to predict
in which contexts a prenominal adjective has to be interpreted as an
appositive rather than a modifier nor can it be used to explain other
restrictions on the positions in which adjectives can occur (e.g. why *big the
dog and *the big one dog are unacceptable). Thus while the strategy of
looking at the relative "nounlikeness" of adjectives may be useful as a
processing strategy, it leaves a number of seemingly related phenomena
unexplained.
Martin (1969) investigated a number of semantic factors that
may be relevant to the ordering of prenominal adjectives. He asked subjects
to rate a number of adjectives on the semantic dimensions, definiteness of
denotation, absoluteness, imagery, and substantiveness. The dimensions
were defined as follows: definiteness of denotation is the degree to which
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adjectives are definite in meaning to the class of all nouns. This notion is
similar to the notion of the number of values an adjective names on a
dimension. Those adjectives which are definite in denotation have the same
value for a large class of nouns where as those that are less definite in
denotation have may different values for the class of all nouns. Absoluteness
was defined as the number of comparisons needed in order to determine
whether a given adjective applies to an entity. It is proposed that an adjective
like black requires no comparisons but that an adjective such as big requires
many comparisons. Imagery was defined in terms of the adjective's ability to
invoke images and substantiveness was defined in terms of how essential
subjects thought the property named by the adjective was to the noun they
modified's meaning. The dimension that correlated most highly with
preferred adjective order was definiteness of denotation: r = .73. This result
supports the account of adjective ordering presented here. As mentioned
above definiteness of denotation is equivalent to the number of values that
are named by an adjective. Adjectives, that are higher in definiteness of
denotation (have fewer values named by the adjective) are preferred closer to
the noun. Martin, however, posits a processing constraint to account for the
ordering of prenominal adjectives. He proposed that the accessibility of an
adjective is related to the order in which prenominal adjectives occur. He
proposes that accessability is related to reaction time and that adjectives that
are easily accessed will occur closer to the noun because the noun phrase is
built from the noun. The plausibility of this account of processing aside,
there are a number of facts that such a theory will be unable to account for.
First, it does not provide an account of why alternate orders are sometimes
acceptable and the conditions under which they are acceptable. Second, such
an account does not explain why the preferred order can be violated in
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parallel modification. Third, there is no explanation for why the preferred
order can be violated with predicational adjectives and parallel modification
without a change in context relating to the number of values represented on
the given dimensions. The account of adjective ordering presented here
accounts for all these facts as well as the experimental results.
Sproat and Shih (1986) propose that the ordering restrictions on
direct (sequential in the terminology used here) modification are cognitively
based and seem to relate to the "apparentness" of the adjective. Apparentness
is said to be related to the number of comparisons that are necessary to
determine whether a particular adjective applies to an entity. It is suggested
that adjectives like red can be attributed to an entity by only looking at low
level properties of the object such as the surface reflectance and that the kind
of object does not have to be identified. Adjectives like large, however, are
less apparent because they require identifying the kind of entity and making
comparisons to other entities of that kind. In support of this model, Sproat
and Shih (1986) found that the strongest preferences in adjective orders occur
between adjectives that differ in predicativeness. Predicative adjectives are
those adjectives that allow inferences such as the one shown in syllogism (96)
(Kamp, 1975). Sproat and Shih found that when there is a predicative and a
non-predicative adjective modifying a noun there is a strong preference for
the predicative adjective being closer to the head noun. This fact is from the
absoluteness of predicative adjectives. The data also support the account of
adjective ordering presented here; predicative adjectives are relatively
invariant across contexts and thus have a single or very few values that are
named by them, whereas non-predicative adjectives vary in their
interpretation in different contexts and thus have many different values that
they name.
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(96) All mice are mammals.
Freddy is a male mouse.
Freddy is a male mammal.
Even if one accepts this analysis of how adjectives are processed there are a
number of problems with this proposal. First, it gives no explanation for why
apparentness is relevant to adjective ordering though it is suggested that the
differences in the amount of computations may be responsible for the order
in which the adjectives can appear. Second, there is no explanation for why
the ordering does not have to hold for parallel modification and predication.
Third, there is no explanation for why alternate orders are sometimes
acceptable and how they are related to the number of values on the
dimensions in the context being considered. The account of adjective
ordering presented here accounts for all these facts as well as the ordering
preferences between adjectives of different predicativeness.
Annear (1964) and Vendler (1968) both propose syntactic accounts of
the ordering phenomenon. Annear (1964) divided adjectives into three
classes and predicted the order in terms of the relative positions of these
classes of adjectives. As Annear notes, this classification is post-hoc and does
not help explain any other phenomena. Vendler (1968) presents a theory or
adjective ordering in terms of the order in which transformations that apply
to different adjectives apply. Once again the theory is purely descriptive
because the order of transformations isn't relevant to any other linguistic
phenomena.
Danks and Glucksberg (1971) propose an account of adjective ordering
that is similar to the account given here. They propose that the ordering of
adjectives is based on their discriminative function in a given context. The
canonical order of adjectives is proposed to correspond to the most frequent
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cases of the discriminative uses of adjectives. While this proposal shares
some aspects with the current proposal, there are a couple of key differences.
First, the current proposal provides an explanation for why some adjectives
may more often play a discriminative role. Adjectives that have more values
on a dimension are more likely to be able to discriminate between two
entities than dimensions that have fewer values on a dimension. Second,
the notion of the number of values on -a dimension is relevant to
phenomena other than the ordering of adjectives (e.g. why one cannot
modify certain types of expressions *big he, *the big one dog; when one has to
interpret an adjective as modificational) while the notion of discriminability
is a function of the context and it is not clear that it plays a role in explaining
other linguistic phenomena.
4.8 Summary.
The semantics of modification was used to motivate an account of
(i) why there has to be an ordering of adjectives when there is sequential
modification, (ii) why the canonical order is what it is, and (iii) when the
order can be violated. It was also shown that this order does not have to hold
for parallel modification or predicative adjectives. The account of adjective
ordering received support from psycholinguistic (Martin, 1969) and linguistic
data (Sproat & Shih, 1986) and provides further evidence for the proposed
semantics of adjectives.
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Chapter 5
Differences Between Modification and Predication
5.1 Introduction.
In previous chapters, it was proposed that adjectives in predicate
position name the value that the entity named by the subject is stated to have
on the dimension named by the adjective. While this definition of
predication is adequate to describe the relationship between the subject and
the adjective in sentences such as (97), it fails to capture the similarity of this
relationship to the relationship between the subjects and the predicates in (98)
- (100). In (97), the adjective tall states the value that the subject has on a the
dimension HEIGHT. In each of (98)-(100), the predicate is stating something
about the subject but this information is not a value a dimension. Given the
parallel structure between the subject and the predicate phrases in (97)-(100), it
seems reasonable to generalize the notion of predication to one in which the
predicate states something about the subject. This is the standard analysis of a
predicate.
(97) The man is tall.
(98) The man is proud of his son.
(99) The man is in the corner.
(100) The man is running faster than a horse.
This more general analysis of predication acknowledges the similarities
between different types of predicates. The specific interpretation regarding the
relationship of the entity named by the subject and what is stated by the
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predicate will depend on the semantics of the specific type of predicate. When
the predicate is simply an adjective then the predicate names a value on a
dimension.
Given that the structural relation between the subject and the predicate
allows one to state things about the subject that are not the value that the
subject has on a dimension, one can ask whether the same is true of the
structural relation that holds between prenominal adjectives and the nouns
they modify. Can expressions which are not adjectives appear in the same
structural position that prenominal adjectives do?
As can be seen from (101)-(104), not all the phrases that can appear as
predicates can appear prenominally. Given the difference in the acceptability
of (101) and (102)-(104), the question arises as to what kinds of elements can
appear prenominally. Why is it that the predicate in (97) can appear in a
prenominal position (101) but the predicates in (98)-(100) cannot?
(101) The tall man ...
(102) * The proud of his son man ...
(103) * The in the corner man ...
(104) * The running faster than a horse man ...
5.2 Restrictions on prenominal phrases.
At first glance it seems that the explanation for the difference between
(101) and (102)-(104) is syntactic and that there is a constraint against phrases
appearing before the noun. Pinker (1984) has noted that this explanation is
inadequate because of the acceptability of sentences like (105) in which the AP
very tall appears prenominally. In addition to sentences like (105) which
have an intensifier in the AP, sentences with prenominal measure phrases
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are also acceptable (106). Note that even if one has an analysis in which very
tall or ten foot tall are not APs but are some other kind of XP, the XP would
have scope over the AP and thus the new analysis would not help
distinguish the difference in acceptability of the APs in (101) and (102).
(105) The very tall man is a basketball player.
(106) The ten foot tall man should be a basketball player.
The difference between (101), (105)-(106) and (102) is that the AP in (102)
has an internal argument but the ones in (101), (9105 and (106) do not. One
possibility concerning the correct generalization is that a phrase can occur
prenominally if the head of the phrase does not have an internal argument.
This generalization would allow (105) and (106) to be acceptable while ruling
out (102)-(104). It is completely unclear, however, why there should be such a
restriction. Syntactic theory attempts to specify the constraints on how
syntactic categories such as N, V, A, NP, VP and AP can be combined. In
doing so, the internal structure of the category is not relevant other than
features of the head, though there may be additional constraints on what the
internal structure of a maximal projection may be. Furthermore, the
restriction as stated above is stipulative. It would be nice if the restriction
were due to some independently motivated principles.
The restriction also does not account for the acceptability of
prenominal phrasal idioms like those in (107)-(109) in a natural way. The
acceptability of the prenominal phrases in (107)-(109) depends on their being
interpreted idiomatically; when the same phrases are interpreted
compositionally the sentence that result are unacceptable (110)-(112).
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(107) The under-the-table dealings of the mafia were known to many.
(108) The over-the-hill hockey players were easily injured.
(109) The off-the-wall behaviour of the linguist was appalling.
(110) * Despite the warning not to eat the food that had fallen under the
table, John ate the under the table food.
(111) * To get to the bus stop you have to go over the hill. The over the hill
bus stop is easy to find.
(112) * The calender fell off the wall, the off the wall calender is out-dated.
The prenominal phrases in (107)-(109) are similar in meaning to
adjectives such as illegal, old and crazy and if one assumes that the semantics
of an idiom determine its argument structure then the idioms would be
acceptable because they would not have an internal argument. While this
assumption about idioms would allow one to explain the acceptability of
(107)-(109), the restriction on prenominal phrases remains stipulative and
descriptive. Furthermore, there are also restrictions on what kinds of
adjectives can appear in this position. I would like to argue that the
restriction on which kinds of phrases and which adjectives can appear
prenominally follows naturally from the semantics of dimensions.
5.3 A semantic constraint on prenominal modifiers.
While many different types of expressions can be used to predicate
information about the entities named by the subject, the kinds of expressions
that can appear in the position that modificational adjectives appear in is
limited to expressions that name values on a dimension. The question that
arises is why values on dimensions cannot be named by phrases that have
heads with internal arguments? For example, why is it the case that proud of
his son cannot be a value on a dimension? Those men who are proud of
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their sons would be said to have that value on the dimension and different
men could have the value to varying degrees.
The reason that phrases that have heads with internal arguments
cannot name values on a dimension is that they name a property of an entity
only in relation to an external entity. Because these phrases name a property
of an entity only in relation to an external entity they allow for the possibility
of a given entity having more than one value on the dimension named by
the head. This is because the entity may have a different value on the
dimension in question if different external entities (internal arguments) are
considered. For example, the phrase proud of his son names a property of a
man in relation to an external entity (his son). This allows the man to have
more than one value on the dimension named by the adjective proud.
Suppose that he is proud of his son but not of his brother, then the man
would have two values on the dimension named by the adjective proud, one
in relation to his son and one in relation to his brother. If the prenominal
position is limited to expressions that name values on a dimension then it is
clear that the phrase proud of his son cannot appear prenominally because it
allows for the possibility that the noun being modified has more than one
value on a dimension.
In the example given above, the phrases proud of his son and proud of
his brother were said to potentially name different values on the dimension
PROUD. One may argue, however, that neither phrase names a value on the
dimension PROUD and that they name values on independent dimensions
PROUD OF HIS SON and PROUD OF HIS BROTHER. If this were the case then the
phrases would not violate the single value on a dimension constraint. The
problem with such a proposal is that it misses the generalization that each of
the phrases is naming the same property but with respect to different entities.
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A related question is why proud of his son cannot name a value but
proud can rather than the other way around? The answer to this question is
that the former is dependent on the latter for its meaning. Proud of his son
names a value on the same dimension as proud but only in relationship to
an external entity. The dimension named by proud would exist even if the
external entity didn't or had no relationship to the dimension whereas the
putative dimension on which proud of his son names values can only exist if
the external entity exists and is related to values on the dimension named by
proud.
In sum, the reason why phrases whose heads have internal arguments
cannot appear prenominally is because the structural position is limited to
expressions that name values of the entity named by the noun. Phrases
whose heads have internal arguments name properties only in relation to
external entities (named by the internal argument) and thus allow for the
possibility of having more than one value on the dimension named by the
head and a given entity can only have one value on any dimension.
5.4 The relation between phrasal modifiers and relative adjectives.
Adjectives like tall name a property of an entity in relation to some
standard and the standard often depends on entities other than the entity
which is being spoken about. If interpreting adjectives like tall and phrases
like proud of his son both depend on entities other than the entities being
spoken about then why can tall appear prenominally but proud of his son
cannot?
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Relative adjectives name values on a dimension in relation to a
standard. The standard itself is a value on the dimension and relative
adjectives name values that are more or less than the standard value. The
standard value is often determined by looking at other entities of the kind
named by the noun and taking an average. While one may look at other
entities to determine what the value of the standard should be, the adjective
names a value on the dimension with respect to the standard value, not with
respect to the entities that are used to determine what the standard value is.
This differs from phrases with heads with internal arguments like proud of
his son, in which the value named by proud is with respect to an external
entity (his son) rather than with respect to another value on the dimension.
Because relative adjectives name values on a dimension with respect to a
standard value, an entity can only have one value on the dimension. By
considering different sets of entities one might change the standard value but
the entity being modified cannot have two values on the dimension for any
particular standard value. The same is not true for phrasal modifiers, for any
set of entities the entity being modified may have more than one value on a
given dimension and thus modifiers that depend on external entities for
their interpretation cannot name values on a dimension.
5.5 Restrictions on prenominal adjectives.
The constraint that restricts expressions in prenominal position to be
expressions that name values on dimensions also explains why certain
adjectives cannot appear prenominally. There are a few adjectives like afraid
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that cannot appear prenominally. A list of the adjectives in Francis and
Kucera (1982) that cannot appear prenominallyI is given below in Table 5.1.2
Table 5.1 Adjectives that cannot appear prenominally
accustomed acquainted ablaze alive
afoul afraid afire asleep
devoid aghast aflame awake
fond ashamed afloat
laden aware aglitter
mindful awash aglow
sure read agleem
unable ready aflutter
alone
On the face of it, it seems unlikely that the constraint that prohibits these
adjectives from appearing prenominally could be semantic. The list of
adjectives contains many adjectives which have near synonyms which can
appear prenominally. Examples of such synonym pairs include afraid/scared,
ablaze/blazing, and aghast/shocked. While these adjectives are semantically
very similar at an intuitive level, I will argue that they are semantically
different in subtle ways and that these subtle differences in semantics are
responsible for the different distributions of these adjectives. 3
1 Note that there are some adjectives on the list that can appear prenominally but when they
do, they combine with the noun to pick out a kind of thing rather than modify the entity named
by the noun. For example, a sure hand is not a hand that is sure but a steady hand and a ready
wit is not a wit that is ready.
2 I am grateful to Dana Sussman for her help in compiling this list.
3 Inspection of the list shows that an extremely large percentage of the adjectives begin
with a. One may be tempted to think that the restriction is phonologically based except that
there are adjectives that cannot appear prenominally which do not begin with a and there are
adjectives like abrupt and absurd that begin with a and can appear prenominally. Another
tempting generalization is that adjectives whose initial morpheme is a cannot appear
prenominally. This hypothesis is better supported than the phonological hypothesis because
there aren't any adjectives in which the initial morpheme is a and can appear prenominally.
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5.5.1 Adjectives with obligatory internal arguments.
Looking at the list of adjectives that cannot appear prenominally one
finds that there are a small number of adjectives like fond and unable that
obligatorily take an internal argument. These adjectives are shown in the
first column of Table 5.1. Given that these adjectives cannot appear without
an internal argument even when in predicate position it seems reasonable to
assume that the reason they cannot appear prenominally is the same reason
that phrases with heads that have internal arguments cannot appear
prenominally. These adjectives allow an entity to have more than one value
on a dimension depending on the external entity considered (named by the
internal argument).
5.5.2 Adjectives with implicit obligatory internal arguments.
In addition to the adjectives that obligatorily require internal
arguments, there is a set of adjectives that do not obligatorily require an
The main problem with such a restriction is that it is completely unclear how a child would
learn such a generalization. The restriction is a language specific one that would apply to
particular morphological forms and thus is unlikely to be part of a child's innate knowledge of
language. This means that children would have to learn this generalization. If children are
productive and extend adjectives they have heard in the predicate position to the prenominal
position they would require negative evidence to realize that certain adjectives cannot appear
in the prenominal position. There is now a great deal of evidence that children do not receive
systematic feedback on the grammaticality of their utterances (Brown & Hanlon, 1970; Marcus,
in press) and thus they could not rely on negative evidence to limit which adjectives can appear
prenominally. Another undesirable property of the morphological restriction is that there is
no explanation for why the restriction is what it is. Finally, even if there were some way in
which the child could learn the morphological restriction, the child would require some other
restriction to rule out the few adjectives that do not start with a but still cannot appear
prenominally. Ideally one would like to have a single restriction account for all the adjectives.
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internal argument when they appear in a predicate position. These adjectives
are shown in the second column of Table 5.1. While these adjectives can
appear without an overt internal argument when they are predicates (113), I
will argue that semantically these adjectives require an internal argument.
The meaning of an adjective such as afraid requires that there is something
that makes the subject afraid. The same is not true of adjectives like hungry.
(113) The man is afraid (of x).
If adjectives like afraid implicitly require internal arguments, then the
reason why they cannot appear prenominally is the same reason why phrases
with heads with internal arguments cannot appear prenominally. However,
scared and frightened are nearly synonymous with afraid and thus should
require internal arguments also and should not be able to appear
prenominally but they can appear prenominally (115), (117). This suggests
that the explanation for why afraid cannot appear prenominally is incorrect
but I will argue that the restriction due to internal arguments is correct but
that there are two homophonous adjectives scared and frightened and that
one of these is barred from appearing prenominally but the other one is not.
(114) The man is scared.
(115) The scared man ...
(116) The man is frightened.
(117) The frightened man ...
What evidence is there that there are homophonous forms of scared
and frightened but only a single form of afraid? When these adjectives
appear prenominally '(115), (117), the entity named by the noun is necessarily
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in a state of being scared or frightened. This is not the case when these
adjectives appear in predicate position. When these adjectives appear in
predicate position, then the entity named by the subject may be in a state of
being scared or frightened but it may also be the case that the subject is not
currently in a state of being scared or frightened but that it is a property of the
subject that they are scared or frightened of something. This reading of the
adjectives is similar to afraid in that it requires an internal argument (which
may not be phonologically overt) (118)-(120) and this reading of the adjective
cannot appear prenominally.
(118) The man is scared (of rabbits).
(119) The man is frightened (of rabbits).
(120) The man is afraid (of rabbits).
The reason for the difference between the adjectives scared and
frightened and afraid becomes clear when one looks at the verbs from which
they are derived. Afraid is derived from fear which has a single argument
structure, while scared and frightened are derived form scare and frighten
each of which have two argument structures. One of the argument structures
of scare and frighten allows the derived adjectives to appear prenominally
while the other one, which is similar to the argument structure of fear,
prevents the derived adjectives form appearing prenominally. In one of the
argument structures of scare and frighten, the subject has the thematic role
AGENT and the direct object is the PATIENT. In this reading the PATIENT is
affected and comes to have the state that is the result of the verb (e.g. the
man in (121), (122) comes to be in a state of being scared or frightened). This is
the argument structure from which the adjectives which can appear
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prenominally are derived (115), (117); the noun being modified by the
adjective has the state named by the adjective.
(121) Rabbits scared the man.
(122) Rabbits frightened the man.
In the second argument structure of scare and frighten, the subject is
the THEME and the direct object is the PATIENT. Unlike the first argument
structure, in this argument structure the PATIENT is not affected (e.g. the man
in (121), (122) does not come to be in a state of being scared or frightened). It
is from this reading that the adjectives scared of and frightened of are derived.
These adjectives do not imply that the man is in a state of being scared or
frightened. The adjective afraid is derived from the verb to fear, this verb
has only one argument structure (123) which is similar to the second
argument structure of scare and frighten of in that the PATIENT is not affected
(e.g. the man in (123) is not in a state of fear).
(123) The man feared rabbits.
To summarize, afraid and one of the argument structures of scared and
frightened name a property of the entity named by the noun (e.g. the man)
only in relation to some other entity (e.g. rabbits). Furthermore, it is not
necessary for the subject to be in the state named by the adjective. The other
argument structure of scared and frightened names a property of the entity
named by the noun. This realization of the adjectives can occur
prenominally.
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For the adjectives that cannot appear prenominally examined so far
one can argue that the semantics of the adjectives require an internal
argument and thus the adjectives cannot appear in a prenominal position
cannot for the same reason that phrases with internal arguments cannot:
they allow for the possibility of a given entity having more than one value on
a given dimension because they name properties only in relation to external
entities.
5.5.3 Adjectives that name properties in relation to an external
entity.
A third group of adjectives that cannot appear in a prenominal
position are those that are listed in the third column of Table 5.1. I argue
that these adjectives do not name properties of the entity named by the noun
per se, rather they name properties of the entity named by the noun only in
relation to an external entity. These adjectives differ from those in the
previous section in that they do not have internal arguments but they are
dependent on external entities for their meaning.
These adjectives are similar to the adjectives discussed in the previous
section in that they state something about the entity named by the noun only
in relation to an external entity. The most obvious example of this is the
adjective alone. It is clear that this adjective states something about the
subject only in relation to other entities: there is no way to tell whether an
entity is alone without considering its relation to other entities. For other
adjectives in this group this semantic property is not as apparent at first
glance. Many of the adjectives have close synonyms which can appear
prenominally. For example, while the adjectives aglow, and aglitter cannot
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appear prenominally glowing, and glittering can do so. I argue that the first
set of adjectives state something that is true of the subject only in virtue of
the subject's relationship to some other entity. This relationship between the
subject entity and an external source is illustrated by the fact that aglow, and
aglitter usually occur with a complement which names the source (124), (126).
Furthermore, these adjectives cannot be used when the entity of which they
are being predicated possess .the property on their own (128). This contrasts
with the closely related adjective glowing which can be used to describe the
state of an entity independently of whether the state is a property of the entity
or if the state is a property of the entity by virtue of a relationship to an
external source (125), (129).
(124) His face was aglow (with pleasure).
(125) His face was glowing (with pleasure).
(126) The lake was aglitter in the moonlight.
(127) The lake was glittering in the moonlight.
(128) * The sun was aglow.
(129) The sun was glowing.
Another set of adjectives in this group includes adjectives like ablaze,
afire and aflame. These adjectives also name a property of the subject entity
which is true by virtue of a relationship to an external entity. These
adjectives can only be use as resultatives and they have an implied external
source (130). The implied external source is evident in their use with the
verb set and the inability of these adjectives to appear with entities that
possess these properties on their own (131). The related adjectives blazing
and flaming cannot be used with the verb set (132) and can be used to describe
entities that intrinsically possess these properties (133).
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(130) John set the house ablaze/aflame/afire.
(131) * The fire was ablaze/aflame/afire.
(132) * John set the fire blazing/flaming.
(133) The fire was blazing/flaming out of control.
The difference between these resultatives and adjectives like aglow and
aglitter is that the latter name properties of an entity that are true of the entity
while it is in a particular relationship to the external source whereas
resultatives name properties that the entity comes to have due to an external
source. The continued existence of the property named by a resultative does
not require a continued relationship between the subject entity and the
source.
Finally, asleep and awake are similar to the resultatives in column
three in that they are both resultatives but unlike the other resultatives the
source is not external. Alive is the only adjective on the list that is not
semantically similar to the other adjectives in any obvious way.
In sum, there is a semantic property that adjectives that cannot appear
prenominally have in common: they name a property of the subject that is
not intrinsic to the entity and is true only in relation to some external source.
In some cases the external source has to be expressed overtly but in others the
source is implicit. Because these adjectives name properties of entities in
relation to external entities, they allow for the possibility that a given entity
will have more than one value on a dimension depending on which external
entities are considered. This prevents these adjectives from appearing
prenominally.
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5.6 Further evidence for the constraint on values on dimensions.
The proposal that modifiers that cannot appear prenominally are those
that name properties in relation to external entities is supported by the
pattern of acceptability exhibited by sentences like (134)-(141). Exactly those
predicates that cannot appear prenominally are the predicates that cannot be
predicated of manner. This makes sense because manner is observable
behaviour. The behaviour is what it is and whether it is judged to be proud
or not does not depend on any other entities such as one's son. It is perfectly
possible to talk about John's manner towards his son (140) but once again the
only question that arises is whether this behaviour can be called proud or not,
independently of considering any other entities. (141) shows that the
unacceptability of (137) and (139) is not due to a constraint against predicating
phrasal modifiers of a genitive subject.4
(134) John is proud.
(135) John's manner is proud.
(136) John is afraid.
(137) * John's manner is afraid.
(138) John is proud of his son.
(139) * John's manner is proud of his son.
(140) John's manner towards his son is proud.
(141) John's sister is proud of his son.
Adjectives like isolated, unread, much read and unique provide
counterevidence to the generalization that adjectives that depend on an
external entity cannot appear prenominally. Why can these adjectives appear
4 Pesetsky (1991) explains why phrases like proud of his son cannot be predicated of expressions
like John's manner in terms of a morphological restriction. He explains a range of phenomena
not discussed here with this restriction. It is unclear, however, how this explanation would
account for why adjectives like afraid cannot be predicated of manner or why the expressions
that cannot be predicated of manner are the same expressions that cannot appear prenominally.
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prenominally? The reason is that each of these adjectives name a value with
respect to the whole set of entities under consideration, rather than with
respect to any particular entity or subset of entities under consideration.
Because these adjectives name a property with respect to the whole set of
entities under consideration, an entity cannot have more than one value on
the relevant dimension. The entity being modified has a single value for the
entities with respect to which the adjective is defined. For example, an
unread book is unread by everyone being considered. Similarly a much read
book is a book that has been read by many of the people being considered and
thus the book cannot also not be much read.
The acceptability of these adjectives as prenominal modifiers suggests
that the constraint on prenominal modifiers is that they cannot have a form
that would allow the entity being modified to have more than one value on a
given dimension. In general, properties that are true of the entity being
modified with respect to external entities lead to the possibility of the entity
having more than one value on the dimension in question. If, however, the
property is defined by the whole set of entities under consideration, then it is
no longer possible for the entity being modified to have more than one value
on the relevant dimension.
5.8 Summary
The current chapter provided evidence for the claim that the structural
position in which prenominal adjectives appear is limited to naming values
on dimensions. Dimensions consist of mutually exclusive values and thus
any phrases or adjectives whose meanings allow for the possibility of the
entity being modified having more than one value is excluded from the
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prenominal position. These included phrases that have heads with internal
arguments and adjectives which name properties in relation to some external
entities. It was also suggested that predication should be viewed as the
general relation that states something about the subject. When the predicate
consists of an adjective then the predicate names the value the subject is said
to have on the given dimension.
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Chapter 6
Semantics of Adjectives and Constraints on Word Learning
6.1 Introduction.
The previous chapters have provided psycholinguistic and linguistic
data that suggest that adults represent adjectives as either naming values on
dimensions or as helping pick out kinds and that adjectives can either
predicate information about an entity or they can be used to talk about a set of
entities on the basis of the value named by the adjective. The evidence
presented thus far shows what the adult's semantic knowledge of adjectives
is. In this chapter, I will show that the data from studies on the acquisition of
adjectives suggest that children's semantic knowledge of adjectives is the
same as that of adults. I will also show how knowledge of the semantics of
adjectives can be used to motivate constraints on word learning. Finally,
three of the constraints are tested in experiments with children and adults.
6.2 Evidence of children's knowledge of the semantics of adjectives.
Taylor and Gelman (1988) have shown that young two year olds (mean
age 26 months) differentiate adjective and noun syntax in learning the
meanings of novel words. In addition to differentiating the two types of
words syntactically, children showed that they knew the semantic correlates
of these syntactic categories. Taylor and Gelman presented children with two
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instances of two kinds of familiar and unfamiliar objects. One of the objects
in each kind had green fur and the other had a yellow and black plaid pattern
on it. Children were taught either an adjective or a noun for one of the
objects and then tested on their interpretation of the novel word. They found
that children were more likely to have a category interpretation when a noun
was used to name a familiar or unfamiliar object than when an adjective was
used. Furthermore, children were more likely to make a property
interpretation when the novel word was an adjective than when it was a
noun. This result is predicted if children know that adjectives name
properties of things but nouns do not. Golinkoff, Mennuti, Lengle, &
Hermon (1992) find a similar pattern of results in two year olds
interpretations of adjectives and nouns.
In the semantics developed here it is proposed that relative adjectives
name a value on a dimension in relation to another (usually standard) value.
Research by Carey (1978) and Gelman and Ebeling (1988) shows that two and
three year olds use the words big and little in relation to a standard value and
that they can use different types of information to determine the standard
value. Gelman and Ebeling (1988) showed that two and three year olds use
normative standards for deciding whether a given object is big or little; when
they were asked whether an object was big or small, they gave a response that
was based on knowledge of the range of sizes for that kind of object. In
addition, children were able to change the standard they used for deciding
whether an object should be called big or not. Children who called an object
big in isolation called the same object little if it were presented in a context in
which it was the smaller of two objects of that kind. Gelman and Ebeling also
showed that three year olds can use information about intended use to
determine the standard value on the dimension SIZE. Children who called a
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hat little in isolation said that the same hat was big for a doll. These data
suggest that two and three year olds, like adults, use words like big and little
to name values in relation to a standard value.
Gelman and Markman (1985) propose that adjectives imply a contrast
between members of a single noun category. Furthermore, they showed that
3-5 year olds can use this knowledge when learning novel words. In the
experiment, they showed children four pictures of novel objects, three of
which had the same shape and thus were meant to be seen as the same kind
of thing and a fourth that differed in overall shape suggesting that it was a
different kind of thing. Of the three objects of the same kind, two had the
same marking and the third one had a different marking. Children were
shown the pictures and asked to give the experimenter the fep or the fep one.
They found that children who heard the novel noun were likely to give the
object that differed in shape while those that heard the novel adjective picked
the object with the distinctive marking. These results were interpreted as
showing that 3-5 year olds know that adjectives imply a contrast within a
noun category. This would follow if children know that adjectives name
properties of things but that nouns do not. Markman and Gelman's (1985)
result is supported by Waxman (1990) who found that adjectives help three
year olds in classifying things at a subordinate level but nouns do not.
A prediction that follows from the semantics of adjectives is that, in
general adjectives should be learned later than noun. This is because the
default interpretation of prenominal adjectives is modificational not
appositive and one cannot know which dimensions the kinds of entities
named by the noun vary on without some experience with that kind. The
prediction that adjectives are learned later than nouns is confirmed by cross-
linguistic evidence (Gentner, 1982). Of course there are likely to be many
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factors contributing to this difference in the order of acquisition but one factor
that has independent motivation is the semantics of adjectives.
Bloom (1990a) investigated one and two year olds' knowledge of
restrictions on modifiers in English. He looked to see whether young
children know that adjectives can precede some kinds of nominals (nouns)
but not others (proper names and pronouns which are proposed to be lexical
NPs). Bloom found that while children produce both adjective-nominal and
nominal-adjective sequences, the former are only produced when the
nominal is a noun but nominal-adjective sequences are produced for nouns,
proper names and pronouns. Bloom interprets this data as evidence that one
and two year olds know the restriction in English that prevents prenominal
adjectives from modifying NPs. While this data is consistent with a
restriction based on the N/NP distinction, it is also consistent with a
restriction that follows from the semantics of modification. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the restriction based on the semantics of modification seems to be
more explanatory in that it explains why there are certain restrictions on
adjectives within NPs and when prenominal adjectives are interpreted as
appositives. In any case, Bloom's data suggest that very young children's
utterances are constrained in the way predicted by the semantics of
modification. Note that for children to use a restriction on the basis of the
semantics of modification they need to have represented adjectives as
naming values on dimensions and so the data implicitly suggests that
children represent adjectives as naming values on dimensions from the very
begining.
Further evidence that young children's knowledge of the semantics of
adjectives is the same as that of adults is that children as young as three order
multiple prenominal adjectives in the same manner as adults (Bever &
86
Epstein, reported in Bever, 1970; Martin & Molfese, 1972). Martin and
Molfese (1972) asked three and four year olds to repeat back sequences of two
adjectives and a noun. Half of the sequences had the adjectives in the order
preferred by adults and the other half had the adjectives in the non-preferred
order. It was hypothesized that if children had the same restrictions on
adjective orderings as adults then they would make more errors in repeating
the sequences which had the adjectives in the non-preferrred order. They
found that the three year olds made the same number of mistakes on the two
kinds of sequences but that four year olds made more errors on the non-
preferred orders than the preferred order. Martin and Molfese interpret this
as evidence that children's sensitivity to the restrictions on adjective ordering
develops between the ages of three and four. It turns out, however, that if
one looks at the kinds of errors made by the three year olds there is evidence
that even three year olds are sensitive to the order in which prenominal
adjectives appear. Errors included many deletions of an adjective, deletions
of the noun and reversals of the adjective order presented. The deletion
errors may be due to processing limitations and do not necessarily bear upon
the question of whether children know the constraints on the ordering of
adjectives. The reversal errors on the other hand bear directly on this
question. Ten out of the 13 reversal errors made by three year olds were on
the non-preferred order; the proportion for four year olds was 15 out of 18.
This data suggests that by the age of three children are sensitive to the
constraints on adjective ordering. This conclusion was supported by the
results of a production task in which three and four year olds were asked to
describe pictures using two adjectives. Children ordered the adjectives as
adults do though some pairs of adjectives were more likely to be ordered in
this manner than others (Martin & Molfese, 1972). The data on adjective
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ordering are consistent with the predictions made by the semantics of
modification.
In summary, the data on the acquisition of adjectives suggests that
young children have the same semantic knowledge of adjectives that adults
have. In particular, they know that adjectives name properties of entities
named by nouns; they know that adjectives imply a contrast (i.e. values on a
dimension are mutually exclusive); adjectives cannot modify pronouns or
proper names, a fact that follows from the semantics of modification; and
they know the constraints on adjective ordering which also follow form the
semantics of modification. In the rest of the chapter I will motivate certain
heuristics that children may use to learn the meanings of words if they have
the adult knowledge of the semantics of adjectives and modification.
6.3 Constraints due to knowledge of the semantics of adjectives.
Knowledge of the semantics of modification can be used to motivate
constraints for the acquisition of adjective meanings. If a speaker hears an
utterance in which a novel adjective is modifying a noun, then the speaker
should be able to rule out those properties that do not vary for the kind
named by the noun as potential meanings of the novel adjective. For
example, if a speaker of English hears the utterance that is a blicket table, the
speaker should be able to rule out the hypothesis that blicket means flat
because blicket appears in a modificational position and all tables are flat and
thus cannot be modified for flatness. Of course it is possible to interpret the
prenominal adjective as an appositive but this is not the default
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interpretation (see Chapter 3). Knowledge of the semantics of modification
motivates the following heuristic for learning the meanings of adjectives.
(I) If a sentence with a prenominal adjective is used to talk about
an entity of the kind named by the noun, then assume that
the adjective names a value on a dimension on which that kind
of entity has more than one value.
6.3.1 Study 1: Semantics of modification as a constraint on adjective
meaning
Study 1 investigated whether adults and children as young as two-and-
a-half years of age can use heuristic (I) to learn the meanings of novel
adjectives. In the experiment subjects were presented with three instances of
a novel kind. The three instances had the same value on two of the three
dimensions (color, texture, marking) tested in the current study and differed
in their values on the third dimension. After naming the kind of object, one
of the three objects was named using a novel prenominal adjective. It was
predicted that if children and adults can use their knowledge of the semantics
of modification to constrain word meanings, then they should think that the
novel adjective names the value on the dimension on which the objects
varied.
Subjects.
Subjects were 30 undergraduate MIT students and 29 children between the
ages of 2;4 and 3;10 with a mean age of 2;11 from daycare centers in the
Boston-Cambridge area.
89
Materials.
The materials consisted of six different kinds of nonsense objects.
There were three instances of each kind of nonsense object. Each kind of
nonsense object was defined by a unique shape. Each of the three kinds of the
objects in the teaching set had the same value on two dimensions (e.g. color
and texture) and differed on the third (e.g. kind of marking). One of the
objects in each of the teaching sets was designated the teaching object. The
response set for a given teaching set contained three instances of a kind that
was different from the teaching objects. Each of the objects in the response set
matched the teaching object on one of the dimensions but differed on the
other two dimensions of the teaching object. An example of a teaching set
and the corresponding response set is shown in Figure 6.1. For the adults, the
response set consisted of three different kinds of objects each matching the
teaching object on only one dimension. The response set was changed for the
children to avoid noise from choices based on a preference for one of the
objects on the basis of it's object kind.
Procedure.
There were two conditions in the experiment, an adjective condition
and a noun condition. The children were asked to play a game with Cookie
Monster in which they were asked to help Cookie Monster pick up the things
he asked for. They were then shown all the objects used in the study and
were asked to help Cookie Monster put the objects into a box. This was done
to give the children a chance to manipulate and play with the novel objects so
that later choices would be less likely to be due to a desire to play with a novel
object. After the objects were put away, Cookie Monster brought out one of
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the triplets from the teaching set and taught the child a name for the kind of
object in the following manner. See these, these are blickets. This one is a
blicket, and this one is a blicket and this one is a blicket. All of these are
blickets, there are three blickets here. The child was then asked to perform
three actions with a blicket. This was to insure that the children thought that
all three objects were blickets.
Adjective condition: In the adjective condition, Cookie Monster then
pointed to one of the teaching objects and said: You see this? This is a fep
blicket. This is a fep blicket. This blicket is fep. These are all blickets and this
blicket is a fep blicket. The child was asked to give Cookie Monster the fep
blicket out of the blickets and then the blickets were put to the side but
remained in sight of the child. The child was then shown the response set
and asked for a fep thing, something which is fep. After the child had made a
choice, the child was asked to give Cookie Monster the fep blicket from the
teaching set. This was to insure that children remembered to which object
the novel adjective had been applied. Each of the subjects participated in
three trials, each of the trials had a different dimension on which the teaching
objects varied. The order in which children received these trials was counter-
balanced across subjects.
Noun condition: A noun condition was included so that one could know
whether the pattern of responses was due to children's knowledge of the
semantics of adjectives or whether children would respond in a similar
manner no matter what type of word was used. The noun condition was
identical except that children were taught a second noun for the teaching
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object rather than an adjective. Children were taught the noun in the
following manner. You see this? This blicket is a fep. This blicket is a fep.
These are all blickets and this blicket is a fep. This blicket is a fep. Children
heard the noun the same number of times children in the adjective condition
heard the adjective. Children were asked to give Cookie Monster the fep out
of the response set.
Results.
The measure of interest is whether children in the adjective condition
are more likely to pick the object in the response set that matches the teaching
object on the dimension of variation than are children in the noun
condition. Only the trials on which children successfully identified the
teaching object at the end of the trial were analyzed. The percentage of
responses in which children picked the object that matched the teaching
object's value on the dimension of variation was 56% in the adjective
condition and 33% in the noun condition. A one-way ANOVA was done
with condition as the independent variable and the number of responses in
which children picked the object that matched the teaching object's value on
the dimension of variation as the dependent variable. The difference in
conditions was significant t(27) = 2.34, p<.01 (one-tailed). The percentage of
responses matching the teaching object's value on the dimension was greater
than would be expected by chance t(13) = 2.97, p< .01. These result suggest that
children can make use of the semantics of modification to decide which
dimension is being named by a novel adjective. Unlike the children, the
adults performed in a similar manner in the adjective and the noun
condition. In both conditions, the adults picked the object that matched the
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teaching object's value on the dimension of variation on practically all the
trials (98% in the adjective condition and 96% in the noun condition). The
responses on the noun trials indicate that they interpreted the novel noun as
meaning glittery object or green object or striped object. This interpretation
was confirmed by subject's report of what they thought the novel word
meant. Unlike children, the adults seem to have been able to resort to a
meta-linguistic strategy to pick the only response that could make sense, even
though this response is unlike any real nouns. The adults reported
consciously figuring out the meaning of the words in both the adjective and
noun condition. The use of a meta-linguistic strategy makes it difficult to
interpret the results as either supporting or rejecting the hypothesis that
adjectives are more likely to name values on dimensions that have more
than one value than dimensions that do not show any variation.
Discussion.
The results of this experiment show that children as young as two-and-
a-half years of age can use use their knowledge of the semantics of adjectives
to constrain their hypotheses about the meanings of a novel adjective.
Children expect an adjective that modifies a noun to name a property that has
more than one value for the kind of entity being spoken about. The study
confirmed Taylor and Gelman's (1988) finding that two year olds differentiate
adjective and noun syntax. The present study goes beyond the results of
Taylor and Gelman (1988) and Gelman and Markman (1985) by showing that
in addition to knowing that adjectives name properties and that adjectives
name contrasts between members of a noun category two-and-a-half year olds
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know that prenominal adjectives usually name values on dimensions which
have more than one value for the kind named by the noun.
The results also show that there isn't a hierarchy for how nameable
properties are. The nameability of a property is a function of the property's
variation for the kind in question. Of course whether a property shows
variation for a given kind cannot be the only factor that is relevant to the
property's nameability. Most kinds of entities vary on more than one
dimension and thus other constraints will be needed to choose among these
dimensions. One possibility for how one might choose between dimensions
that vary is discussed in Study 2 below. These results of the present study also
help explain the difficulty children in Smith, Jones, & Landau (1992) had in
mapping a novel adjective onto a property interpretation. In their study,
children were taught a novel adjective on a single instance of an unfamiliar
kind. In addition to interference form a strong object bias, children had no
information about which dimensions vary and thus are likely to be named.
Finally, the study shed some light on children's expectations about the
semantics of nouns. Children in the noun condition could have taken the
noun to mean green object, or striped object, or glittery object but they did
not. This is consistent with the fact that languages do not have nouns with
meanings of this kind and suggests that the semantic knowledge of nouns
that is responsible for this fact is present in children as young as two and a
half years of age.
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6.3.2 Study 2: Semantic constraints on choosing which dimension is
being named by a novel adjective.
In most cases, objects of a given kind vary on more than one
dimension. How does one decide which dimension is being named by a
novel adjective? One possibility is motivated by the semantics of relative
adjectives such as tall. As discussed in Chapter 2, these adjectives name a
value in relation to another, often standard, value. This knowledge of the
semantics of relative adjectives suggests that a novel adjective will be taken to
name a value in relation to the standard value rather than the standard value
itself. If this is the case, then one might expect that when a novel adjective is
used with a particular entity, the adjective is more likely to name a value on a
dimension on which the entity does not have a standard value, than a
dimension on which the entity has a standard value. For example, if a given
entity has the standard value on the dimension HEIGHT but has a value that
differs from the standard on the dimension WIDTH, then one would expect
that the novel adjective names a value on the dimension WIDTH.
The current experiment investigates whether values that are different
from the standard or typical value are more likely to be named than values
that are typical for the entities in question. The semantic analysis of
adjectives clearly motivates such a heuristic for learning adjectives that name
values on continuous dimensions because adjectives that name values on
continuous dimensions do so only in relation to another, usually standard,
value. However, the same heuristic may be used to learn adjectives that
name values on discrete dimensions.
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While discrete adjectives do not name values with respect to a
standard value, knowledge of the standard value is relevant for whether a
prenominal adjective is to be interpreted as being modificational or
appositive. For example, the adjectives in phrases like the spotted leopard or
the feathered bird are likely to be interpreted as appositives because leopards
are usually spotted and most bird have feathers. Thus knowledge of the
standard value on discrete dimensions is relevant for how prenominal
adjectives are interpreted. Furthermore, there is evidence that suggests that
we represent the standard or typical values that different kinds of things have
on dimensions (Rips, 1989). Given that we represent standard values for
discrete dimensions, it may be the case that a novel adjective would be more
likely to name a value that is different from the standard for continuous as
well as discrete dimensions.
The current experiment investigated whether values that are different
from the standard are more likely to be named by a novel adjective than the
standard value. Discrete dimensions were used because it is difficult to create
the appropriate stimuli for relative dimensions for use with children as
young as three years. Relative adjectives like tall require the presentation of
multiple objects so that children can determine whether a given object is
named by the adjective. Discrete adjectives like spotted, on the other hand,
can be portrayed using a single object.
Subjects.
Subjects were 20 children between the ages of 3;1 and 3;9 with a mean age of
3;5 from daycare centers in the Boston-Cambridge area.
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Materials.
Three sets of stimuli were created in the following manner. Each set
consisted of two kinds of objects that three year olds are familiar with. There
were three instances of each of the two kinds of objects. One of the instances,
the teaching object, had a standard value on one dimension (D1) and a value
that is different from the standard on another dimension (D2). The second
instance of the kind had the standard value from the first instance on D1 but
not the value that was different from the standard (D2). The third instance
had the value that was different from the standard (D2) but not the value that
was standard (Dl). For example, a transparent spotted glass served as one of
the teaching objects. The property of transparency is standard for a glass but
being spotted is not. The second object in the set was a transparent glass that
was not spotted and the third object was a spotted glass that was not
transparent. The kinds of objects in a set were chosen such that the value that
was considered standard for one kind of object was considered different from
standard for the other kind of object. For example, the transparent spotted
glass was paired with a transparent spotted dress. Unlike glasses, it is strange
for a dress to be transparent but it is not strange for a dress to be spotted. The
list of objects and properties used in the experiment are given in Table 6.1
below.
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Table 6.1 List of objects and properties used in the experiment.
Procedure.
There were two conditions in the experiment, an adjective condition
and a noun condition. Twelve children participated in the adjective
condition and 8 participated in the noun condition. The children were asked
to play a game with Cookie Monster in which they were asked to help Cookie
Monster pick up the things he asked for. They were told that he was really
picky and wanted them to give him only the objects that he had asked for.
Children were then given two practice trials in which they were asked to give
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Teaching Same kind of Same kind of Different kind of Different kind of
object object; matching object; matching object; matching object; matching
standard value non-standard standard value non-standard
on teaching value on on teaching value on
object teaching object object teaching object
transparent opaque transparent opaque transparent
spotted dress spotted dress plain dress spotted glass plain glass
transparent transparent opaque transparent opaque
spotted glass plain glass spotted glass plain dress spotted dress
3-legged furry 4-legged furry 3-legged plain 4-legged furry 3-legged plain
bear bear bear stool stool
3-legged furry 3-legged plain 4-legged furry 3-legged plain 4-legged furry
stool stool stool bear bear
red bent leg flesh tone red straight white bent red straight
bent leg leg fork fork
red bent fork red straight white bent red straight flesh tone
fork fork leg bent leg
Cookie Monster only those objects that were named by a familiar noun or
adjective.
Adjective condition: Half the children were taught a novel adjective on
one of the teaching objects in each set. Cookie Monster showed the child the
teaching object and then described various properties of the object including
the two properties of interest. The English words for the properties of interest
were not used. The order in which the properties were spoken about was
random. The following is a sample protocol.
Look at this. This is a glass. Let's look at it. It is round. it is small. You can
drink out of it. It has these on it (pointing to spots). And you can see through
it (holding glass up to child's eyes). And you know what? This is a fep glass.
This glass is fep. This is a fep glass. I don't know what fep means but Cookie
Monster says that this is a fep glass and wants you to help him find the fep
things. Remember to give him only the things which are fep; the fep things.
The child was then shown a response set which contained (i) the teaching
object, (ii) the other two objects of the same kind: one which had the same
value as the standard but not the value that differed from the standard on the
teaching object, and (iii) the two non-teaching objects from the matched kind:
one which had the same value as the standard but not the value that differed
from the standard on the teaching object. A sample teaching object and
response set is shown in Figure 6.2. After the child made a choice, the
experimenter would ask are there anymore things which are fep, any more
fep things or is that it? This question was repeated after each choice.
Noun condition: The other half of the children were taught a novel noun
for one of the teaching objects in each set. As in the first experiment, the
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noun condition was included to insure that the responses children made
were due to their knowledge of the semantics of adjectives rather than
responses they would make for any kind of word. The procedure was
identical to the adjective condition except that the experimenter taught the
child a noun rather than an adjective: You see this, this glass is a fep. This
glass is a fep. This glass is a fep. The experimenter then said, I don't know
what fep means but Cookie Monster says that this is a fep and wants you to
help him find the feps. Remember to only give him the feps; give him the
feps.
Results.
The measure of interest in this experiment was whether children in
the adjective condition would be more likely to think that a novel adjective
names a value on a dimension on which an entity has a non-standard value
than a dimension on which the entity has a standard value. The analyses of
the data were performed in two ways. First, each trial was categorized as to
whether the pattern of responses showed that: (i) the novel word was naming
the property for which the teaching object had a non-standard value, (ii) the
novel word was naming the property for which the teaching object had a
standard value, or (iii) neither. A word was considered to be naming a
property if the child picked only those items that had the relevant property
and at least one of the items was not the teaching object. The trials were also
categorized as to whether they fit a category interpretation for the same kind
as the teaching object or for the other kind of object. Table 6.2 shows the
percentage of trials that fell into these categories in the two conditions.
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Table 6.2 Percentage of types of responses
As can be seen, the majority of children could not be classified as
having named a value on either of the dimensions being considered or
falling into any category. A one-way ANOVA was performed to see if
children in the adjective condition were more likely to interpret an adjective
as naming the property which was nonstandard on the teaching object than
children in the noun condition. Similarly, a one-way ANOVA was
performed to see if children in the noun condition were more likely to
interpret a noun as naming the category of the teaching object than children
in the adjective condition. Neither analysis yielded significant results but this
may be due to the small number of subjects and the even smaller number of
trials that could be interpreted as belonging to any of these categories. It
seems likely that both effects would become significant with slightly larger
sample sizes.
One problem with the analyses reported above is that there was a large
tendency for children to give the experimenter all or many of the objects and
it is possible that a number of the objects were given as part of a routine or a
bias. For this reason, the next measure compared the number of times the
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Condition Property Property Category Category not
matching matching non- matching the matching the
standard value standard value teaching object teaching object
on teaching on teaching object
object
Adjective .17 0 .31 .03
Noun 0 0 .42 0
first non-teaching item picked had the standard value on the teaching object
and the number of times it had the non-standard value in the two conditions.
It was postulated that children's first choices were less likely to be due to a
task bias and more likely to reflect children's intertpretation of the novel
words. The first non-teaching object picked in the adjective condition had the
value that was non-standard on the teaching object on 73% of trials in the
adjective condition and 29% of trials in the noun condition. This difference
was significant, t (17) = 2.56, p <.035 (one-tailed). The percentage of trials on
which the first non-teaching object matched the nonstandard value of the
teaching object in the adjective condition was marginally greater than would
be expected by chance, t(10)=2.304, p < .06 (one-tailed).
Discussion.
The results of this experiment provide support for the hypothesis that
children will take a novel adjective to name a value on a dimension that is
different from the standard for the entity under consideration. Though there
was a great deal of noise in the data, the pattern of results are consistent with
the heuristic derived from the semantics of adjectives. A major source of
noise in the present experiment was the bias children had for giving the
experimenter all the objects. In addition to this task related source of noise,
there were probably a number of other sources of noise. For one thing, it was
assumed that children were familiar with the kinds of objects used in the
experiment and that they knew what the standard values for the dimensions
in question are. To the extent that children are unsure of this knowledge,
they will be unable to make use of the proposed heuristic. Furthermore,
children did not always attend to the syntactic frame in which the novel
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words were taught. At least two children in the adjective condition spoke
about the objects using the novel adjective as a count noun even though they
had been taught an adjective and had been asked to repeat the novel word in
an adjectival frame. Despite these multiple sources of noise three year olds
were more likely to think that a novel adjective named a nonstandard value
than a standard value.
The present experiment along with the previous experiment shows
that three year olds can use their knowledge of the semantics of adjectives to
constrain their hypotheses about the meanings of novel adjectives. Three
year olds know that prenominal novel adjectives are more likely to name
values on dimensions on which there is variation than dimensions on
which there is no variation, Furthermore, those dimensions that have
values different from the standard value are more likely to be named than
dimensions on which the entity under consideration has the standard value.
This second heuristic allows children to decide which of two dimensions that
show variation is likely to be named by a novel adjective.
However, there are likely to be many situations in which two
dimensions have values that are different from the standard. How does one
know which dimension a novel adjective is likely to name in this kind of a
situation? One possibility is that one can make use of a notion such as
"distance from the standard" and then propose that dimensions on which the
adjective is further from the standard are more likely to be named than
dimensions on which the value is closer to the standard. While this may
turn out to be true, it is unclear what aspect of the semantics of adjectives
would motivate such a heuristic. The notion of "distance from the standard"
does not play a role in the semantics developed here. One way in which the
103
notion could play a role in learning novel adjectives is in the application of
the heuristic tested in the present experiment. It may be the case that the
more different a given value is from the standard, the more likely it is that it
is seen as differing from the standard. If this is the case, then the present
heuristic may, in some cases, be able to help a learner choose between two
dimensions that have values that differ from the standard.
The fact that children use this heuristic when learning novel adjectives
shows that the notion of standard value is relevant for discrete adjectives as
well as relative adjectives. It was proposed that the notion of a standard
value on discrete dimensions is relevant for deciding whether an adjective
should be interpreted as being modificational or as an appositive. The results
of Study 2 suggest that conditions on interpretation in addition to manner of
representation can serve as an important source of constraint in word
learning.
6.3.3 Study 3: Constraints on noun meanings from the semantics of
adjectives.
The previous two studies have investigated constraints on adjective
meanings that are motivated by knowledge of the semantics of adjectives and
modification. The current study investigates a heuristic that is motivated by
the semantics of modification that constrains the meanings of nouns. The
default interpretation of prenominal adjectives is modificational. In order for
an adjective to be interpreted as modifying a noun, it has to be the case that
the entities named by the noun have a value that is different than the one
named by the prenominal adjective. If a learner has this knowledge of
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modification then they would know that entities named by the noun vary on
the dimension on which the prenominal adjective names a value. This
prediction was tested in Study 3.
Subjects.
Subjects were 80 undergraduate MIT students.
Materials & Procedure.
Eight versions of a questionnaire were prepared in the following
manner. On the first page of the questionnaire subjects were presented with a
picture of a novel object. Half the questionnaires with a given novel object
were labeled with a novel noun (e.g. This is a blicket). The other half were
labeled with a familiar prenominal adjective and a novel noun (e.g. This is a
hairy blicket). Two kinds of objects were used in the questionnaires. Each
kind of object was paired with two adjectives. In all the versions, the next
two pages contained the response set which included five distortions of the
original object and another object with a completely different shape. One of
the distortions had the property named by the adjective while the others had
other values on the same dimension.1 The object with the completely
different shape also had the value named by the adjective. Subjects were
asked to indicate whether each of the objects in the response set could be
named by the novel noun. They were also asked to rate how certain they
were of their response on a scale of 1-10.
In the case of the item with the adjective six-legged, 3 of the distortions were six-legged and
two weren't.
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Results.
The variable of interest was whether subjects in the adjective condition
would extend the novel noun to more instances than in the no adjective
condition. A 2X4 ANOVA with condition (adjective/no adjective) and
adjective as the independent variables and the number of items chosen in the
response set as the dependent variable was conducted. The only significant
effect was of condition F(1,72) = 7.76, p < .007. Subjects picked more items in
the adjective condition than in the no adjective condition. No difference was
found in the ratings of the items that were picked as being named by the
noun in the two conditions. This suggests that the presence of the adjective
affected whether subjects thought that a given entity was named by the novel
noun but not the degree to which they are certain that a given entity is named
by the novel noun.
These results show that subjects were willing to extend a novel noun
to a greater number of entities if they had seen the noun modified by a
familiar adjective than if they hadn't. While this is consistent with the
predictions made by the semantics of modification, the predictions of the
semantics of modification are more specific. The prediction is that subjects
should be more likely to name items of the kind named by the noun which
have other values on the dimension named by the adjective if they have
heard the noun modified by the adjective. In order to test this more specific
prediction a parallel set of analyses was performed without the items in the
response set that matched the teaching item on the value of the teaching
item and without the distractor. Excluding these items insured that a
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difference between the two conditions would be due to items with other
values on the relevant dimensions being chosen rather than a tendency to
pick the items that match the value named by the adjective in the adjective
condition. The results were identical to the previous analyses; subjects
picked more items in the adjective condition than the no adjective condition,
F(1,72) = 10.879, p< .002; and no difference in the ratings. The percentage of
novel instances to which the novel noun was extended for the four adjectives
in each condition is given below in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3 Percentage of novel instances to which novel noun was extended.
Adjective condition No Adjective condition
spotted 62.5 47.5
striped 65.0 55.0
hairy 90.0 40.0
six-legged 56.7 40.0
Discussion.
These results confirm the hypothesis that subjects are likely to extend a
novel noun to items with different values on a given dimension if they hear
the noun used with a prenominal adjective that names values on that
dimension. These results extend those of Landau, Smith, & Jones (1988) and
Jones, Smith, & Landau (1991) who have found that adults and two and three
year olds extend count nouns used to name unfamiliar objects on the basis of
shape and that they extend the novel nouns on the basis of shape and texture
when the object has eyes, suggesting animacy. They propose that children can
use information about the co-occurrance of different types of features (e.g.
eyes and texture) to make certain features of objects more relevant (e.g.
texture) to the generalization of count nouns for that object. The present
experiment provides evidence for a linguistic source of information that can
lead the learner to generalize a count noun for an object on the basis of a
property other than shape. The advantage of the heuristic proposed here is
that it does not require the learner to have nonlinguistic knowledge of the co-
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occurrance of different types of features. The learner only needs to know the
meaning of the adjective and the semantics of modification. Future research
will determine whether young children can make use of this source of
information when learning the meanings of novel nouns.
6.4 Conclusions from the acquisition data.
The results of the experiments reported here show that knowledge of
the semantics of adjectives can be used to learn the meanings of words. In
addition to providing information about how meanings of adjectives may be
learned. The present experiments present acquisition data that supports the
analysis of the semantics of adjectives proposed in this thesis. Finally, given
that children are able to exploit knowledge of the semantics of adjectives to
learn the meanings of novel adjectives, these data suggest that at least some
links between grammatical categories and nonlinguistic cognition are bi-
directional.
6.5 Questions raised by the present analysis.
In this section, I discuss a number of questions that are raised by the
semantic analysis of adjectives that is proposed in this thesis. I will also
discuss possible solutions to these questions that will have to be investigated
in future research.
The analysis of adjectives proposes that there are two types of
adjectives, those that name values on dimensions and those that combine
with nouns to name certain kinds of things. An obvious question that arises
is how does the learner know to which of these two kinds of adjectives a
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novel adjective belongs? In addition to raising this question, the analysis
suggests some answers. First, because adjectives that help name kinds of
things do not name properties of things, if one hears an adjective in a
predicate one can conclude that the adjective names a value on a dimension.
A second way in which one could learn that a novel adjective names a value
on a dimension is if one hears a pair of sentences like (143) and (144). It is
clear from these sentences that if zav is an adjective then it has to be an
adjective that names a value on a dimension. This is because one would
know from (2) that fep names a value on a dimension and adjectives that
help name a kind can only modify a noun or an adjective noun combination
in which the adjective is an adjective that helps name a kind. Third, if an
adjective appears with an intensifier or in a comparative form, then the
adjective has to name a value on a dimension because adjectives that help
name kinds have to be discrete.
(143) The blicket is fep.
(144) The zav fep blicket is expensive.
While the heuristics mentioned above provide a way of deciding
which adjectives name values on dimensions, they do not provide a way of
determining which adjectives help name a kind. One possibility is that the
default meaning of an adjective is that they help name kinds of things and
only if one gets information of the kind mentioned above do we decide that
the adjective names a value on a dimension. There are number of problems
with this proposal. First, though we do not have the relevant data it seems
likely that we do not have to hear an adjective in predicate position or with
an intensifier or as a comparative in order to know that it names a value on a
dimension. Furthermore, it is not clear how an adjective would ever come to
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be used with a meaning other than one which helps pick out a kind. The
point is that ultimately the difference between the two kinds of adjectives is a
semantic difference and while syntactic and morphological cues may help one
decide whether particular adjectives belong to one or the other semantic class,
the syntactic and morphological cues are dependent on a semantic distinction.
The question then becomes, how does the child initially know that a given
word names a dimension or helps pick out a kind?
The heuristics presented in this thesis assume that the learner
conceptualizes the entities in question as having values on various
dimensions. It is not obvious, however, what should be conceptualized as a
dimension. Notions that are conceptualized in English as dimensions
include readily perceivable physical attributes like size shape, color and
texture as well as mental attributes like happiness, nervousness, and jealousy;
internal states like hungriness and queasiness; and abstract properties like
legality, appropriateness and absurdity. Furthermore, not all languages
lexicalize these properties as adjectives (Dixon, 1982; Gentner, 1982) and
within a language one can often talk about the same situation in more than
one way. For example, In English, we can convey the notion that an apple is
red by saying something like the apple has redness. This leads to a very
difficult learning situation unless there are certain notions that are always
lexicalized as adjectives. If this is the case then one can learn the syntactic
properties of adjectives with a given meaning by attending to how these
canonical dimensions are named and then learn to extend this
conceptualization to other domains through the use of language. It turns that
there is a small set of notions that are always lexicalized as adjectives (Dixon,
1982). In a cross-linguistic survey of seventeen languages, Dixon (1982) found
that words that name values on the dimensions of AGE (e.g. young/old),
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PHYSICAL DIMENSION (e.g. big/small), VALUE (e.g. good/bad) and COLOR are
always lexicalized as adjectives; even in languages with very small adjective
classes. This suggests that children can learn the syntactic and morphological
properties of adjectives that name dimensions when they learn names for
these dimensions and can then rely on linguistic information to identify
other notions that are conceptualized as dimensions in their speech
community.
This proposal is similar to semantic bootstrapping theories (Grimshaw,
1981; Pinker, 1984) in that it makes use of canonical mappings between
semantics and syntax to learn aspects of syntax but it differs from these
theories in that it proposes that the mappings are bi-directional and thus the
syntax can be used to learn aspects of the word's meaning. The current
proposal is an example of the semantic competence hypothesis proposed by
Bloom (1990).
6.6 Conclusions.
This thesis explored the possibility of deriving constraints on the
acquisition of adjective meanings from knowledge of the semantics of
adjectives. The assumption that underlies such a project is that there are at
least some bi-directional links between grammar and cognition. This
assumption was supported by the results of the word learning experiments,
which showed that one can use knowledge of how grammatical categories are
related to nonlinguistic cognition to help learn the meanings of novel
adjective. The links themselves are not sufficient to allow the learner to infer
the meanings of the novel word but when knowledge of the links is
combined with nonlinguistic knowledge about the entity being considered,
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the semantics of adjectives provide a powerful constraint on the meaning of
the novel adjective. In conclusion, the experiments in the current thesis add
to a large body of data suggesting that children's knowledge of language is the
same as that of adults. If this is so, then looking at adult knowledge of
language is likely to provide and extremely important and useful source of
constraint on the kinds of mechanisms that are used to read speakers' minds.
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Teaching Set
Teaching Object
green
glittery
striped
red
not glittery
striped
green
not glittery
plain
Figure 6.1. Sample stimuli for Study 1.
120
green
glittery
spotted
green
glittery
plain
red
glittery
plain
)
Teaching Object
* ,
* *
* 4
* ,4
4 4
4
4, 4
spotted transparent glass
spotted opaque glass
spotted opaque dress transparent dress
Figure 6.2 Sample teaching object and response set.
All the items were used in the response set.
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